ARTICLE

Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary Law

Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur, and Richard H. McAdams

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† Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Ludwig and Hilde Wolfe Research Scholar, The University of Chicago Law School.
†† Deputy Dean and Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
‡ Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar, The University of Chicago Law School.

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INTRODUCTION

The recent wave of behavioral economics has led some theorists to advocate the possibility of “libertarian paternalism,” in which regulators designing institutions permit significant individual choice but nonetheless use default rules to “nudge” cognitively biased individuals toward particular salutary choices. In this Article, we add the possibility of a different kind of nudge: temporary law.

The case for temporary law arises from a particular regulatory rationale. In some cases, the best normative defense of regulation against the libertarian critique—the best response to the claim that free market competition produces efficiency—is path dependence, the idea that market institutions can become trapped or locked in to a suboptimal equilibrium, even when

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For criticisms, see generally Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U Chi L Rev 133 (2006) (arguing that bounded rationality undermines the case for paternalism when individuals have a stronger incentive to overcome bias and “choose well” when purchasing than when voting); Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW U L Rev 1245 (2005) (critiquing libertarian paternalism on multiple grounds).
some better equilibrium exists. For our purposes, it suffices to define an equilibrium as a behavioral outcome that is stable in this way because no one individual gains by changing behavior given what the other individuals are doing. Some situations allow for multiple equilibria: multiple behavioral patterns that, once reached, are stable. When this is true, there is no reason to expect that the outcome that market competition produces will inevitably be the best one, the global social optimum. Instead, it may be merely a “local maximum.” The outcome that occurs therefore depends arbitrarily on the behavioral starting point; different paths do not all lead to efficiency.

A few legal scholars have explored the relevance of path-dependent legal evolution, particularly in corporate law. The literature on path dependence spans the social sciences. See generally W. Brian Arthur, *Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy* (Michigan 1994) (providing an economic theory of path dependence); Scott E. Page, *Path Dependence*, 1 Q J Polit Sci 87 (2006) (reviewing the use of path dependence in political science theory); James Mahoney, *Path Dependence in Historical Sociology*, 29 Theory & Society 507 (2000) (reviewing path dependence in history and sociology). Not surprisingly, there is no single meaning of the term, but we follow a common usage in referring to the fact that the equilibrium that exists is not the only one possible within the same parameters (individual preferences and wealth) but that trivial differences in starting points or exogenous events along the way produced the current equilibrium. For a criticism of the concept as applied to product markets, see S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, *Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History*, 11 J L, Econ & Org 205, 215–23 (1995).

Put differently, an equilibrium is a pattern of individual behavior that “may be rationally sustained as unique best responses to each other.” Roger B. Myerson, *Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria*, 5 Chi J Intl L 91, 92 (2004). More technically, in game theory, a Nash equilibrium is based on the principle that the combination of strategies that players are likely to choose is one in which no player could do better by choosing a different strategy given the ones the others choose. In two-player games, a pair of strategies will form a Nash equilibrium if each strategy is one that cannot be improved upon given the other strategy. We establish whether a particular strategy combination forms a Nash equilibrium by asking if either player has an incentive to deviate from it.


There are several technical matters of path dependence that need not detain us. For example, one might distinguish between path dependence that arises because of trivial differences in initial conditions and path dependence that arises because of identical initial conditions combined with random differences in intervening events. The analysis that follows will work under different assumptions about how path dependency arises.

fields of intellectual property and antitrust are also concerned with the path dependence of technological change. But the general literature on regulation has, quite surprisingly, not appreciated the importance of the concept to discussions of market failure, a shortcoming we hope to correct. Most importantly for our purposes, the literature has failed to note this rather surprising implication: temporary law may have a significant advantage over permanent law. When the rationale for regulation is to overcome path dependence, there is no need for a permanent restriction on liberty and there are several critical reasons to make the restriction temporary.

We thus propose imagining regulations that include an expiration date. Our principal example for illustrating these points is the regulation of smoking in public places, a field that has seen substantial change in recent years. Libertarians and other market optimists assert that, in the absence of government regulation, competition among private suppliers would produce the optimal number of nonsmoking establishments—malls, restaurants, bars, apartment buildings. Yet when the government did not regulate, nonsmokers felt that there were an insufficient number of nonsmoking options. In our personal observations across many jurisdictions, there were literally no nonsmoking bars, meaning that there was no good option for nonsmokers.

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What does it mean for nonsmokers to complain that, without government intervention, the market is underserving their needs? One possibility is that the only equilibrium consisted of a small number of nonsmoking options because smokers cared much more about the issue than nonsmokers. In other words, if the only choice is smoking, nonsmokers patronize the establishment and grumble, but if the only choice is nonsmoking, smokers stay home and withhold their patronage altogether. This is the intuition of the libertarian, who explains that nonsmokers are being hypocritical because they are not willing to pay sufficiently to induce bars, restaurants, and other establishments to switch to nonsmoking.

Yet there is a second possibility: path dependence. For reasons explored below, rational mechanisms and behavioral biases could have created a situation in which the same set of preferences and levels of wealth permit at least two equilibrium outcomes, one with a high proportion of smoking establishments and the other with a low proportion. In this context, an equilibrium means that no owner of an establishment has any incentive to change the smoking status of the establishment because she is making as much or more profit with the smoking policy she has. If there are multiple equilibria, then it is possible that the low-smoking equilibrium is optimal, and we have reached the high-smoking equilibrium only because of the happenstance that our starting point from decades ago, when preferences and beliefs about smoking were different, involved high smoking rates and near-universal tolerance of smoking. Had history been different, the same preferences (the ones that existed before smoking bans) could have sustained a different and lower level of smoking establishments. If freedom of choice and market competition are consistent with two behavioral patterns, we should want to reach the efficient pattern, not the one that happens to emerge first.

Given path dependence, it may be desirable to use law to shift society from the high-smoking to the low-smoking equilibrium. Across a large domain of issues besides smoking, the best argument that can be made for legal intervention and the most charitable interpretation of the arguments that are made is exactly this point: that the status quo is trapped in an inefficient equilibrium and that law will shift the system to a more desirable equilibrium, one that is also consistent with individual choice to satisfy existing preferences.
The possibility that multiple equilibria exist in a variety of regulatory contexts has never been thoroughly considered. Part of this Article’s contribution is to identify a list of mechanisms that can produce multiple equilibria. Our main point, however, is to explain why, when multiple equilibria exist, the best response is usually a temporary law. If the problem is path dependence, a temporary law will often be both necessary and sufficient to move behavior to the more efficient outcome. For example, suppose the status quo among a city’s restaurants is a high-smoking equilibrium (95 percent permit smoking) and we believe there is a more efficient low-smoking equilibrium (10 percent permit smoking). If the temporary law bans smoking in all restaurants for a certain time period (say, two years), it pushes toward a zero-smoking outcome. When the law is removed, restaurant owners will decide whether to allow smoking again; many will. But the implication of there being a low-smoking equilibrium is that the number of restaurants allowing smoking will rise from zero to the number the low-smoking equilibrium represents (10 percent) and then stop. In short, the concept of path dependence identifies the importance of arbitrary starting points; temporary law offers a new “starting” point, resetting the system to allow the emergence of the equilibrium with the lowest smoking levels.

It should be immediately apparent that the temporary law cannot be a first-best solution. The first-best solution would be to move directly to the more efficient equilibrium. In the smoking example, part of the cost of the temporary ban is the inefficiency of having too few restaurants—zero—that allow smoking during the period the law is in effect. If the efficient low-smoking equilibrium is that 10 percent of restaurants allow smoking, then the state could just create licenses equal to 10 percent of the restaurants and allocate them by auction or lottery, enforcing a ban against only unlicensed restaurants. If this is the situation, there is no advantage to making the law temporary, as a permanent law merely requires people to do what they already want to do in equilibrium.

The problem, however, is that this first-best, direct solution demands costly or unobtainable information. We might have no good way of estimating the exact location of the low-smoking equilibrium. And here we see the possible advantage of a temporary law. If we are uncertain what the low-smoking equilibrium is—perhaps it is 10 percent of restaurants, but it could be as
high as 35 percent or as low as 5 percent—we will likely grant too many or too few licenses, thereby forcing an inefficient level of smoking indefinitely. With the temporary law, the short-term inefficiency is likely greater—requiring 0 percent smoking restaurants is too low—but lasts for only a limited period, after which voluntary exchange produces the low-smoking equilibrium.

This revelation—what might be called “equilibrium location”—is only the first informational advantage of temporary law. For the second, assume there is also uncertainty or ambiguity about the entire situation just described. There may be multiple equilibria, but there is also some chance that there is really only one behavioral pattern consistent with existing preferences and free exchange. If so, the libertarian has a good reason to assert that the status quo already represents the efficient outcome. The licensing scheme then imposes a severe inefficiency (for example, 10 percent of restaurants are smoking when 95 percent is efficient) for an indefinite time. It also offers no mechanism for revealing whether the licensing scheme represents a suboptimal outcome. But when the temporary law expires, if the premise on which it was based were false, and there were only one equilibrium, then restaurants would return to their initial level of permitting smoking (95 percent). We will then learn that there was no market failure to be solved. Thus, temporary law works like an experiment. The information it reveals is both equilibrium location and what might be called “equilibrium verification.”

We identify a number of other advantages to temporary law. By verifying and locating the other equilibrium, one saves on enforcement costs, as by definition there is no need to enforce an equilibrium. There is also the promise of greater intellectual honesty: once temporary law is a salient part of the regulatory tool kit, those who claim that path dependence justifies regulation will propose only temporary law, while those who propose permanent law will be forced to claim some justification other than path dependence. Finally, temporary law is a form of political compromise that might decrease the costs of political struggles. Proponents of regulation will accomplish their goal but

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will, by accepting an expiration date, bear the costs of extension. Opponents of regulation will be less opposed to temporary rules than permanent ones. Furthermore, if the proponents and opponents of regulation have genuine uncertainty about the consequences of a particular intervention, they might welcome the information revealed by the temporary law.

Situations of multiple equilibria are common, and we offer a number of examples to demonstrate the phenomenon. In rational-choice theory, there are various kinds of coordination games that have multiple equilibria. We discuss these situations, but we also emphasize the role of bounded rationality and cognitive biases. Cognitive limitations often produce an important asymmetry: the operation of various biases favors the status quo and is therefore capable of stabilizing more than one behavioral outcome, should it become the status quo. Consider, for example, the availability heuristic, by which people tend to overestimate the occurrence of things readily called to mind. In a world in which restaurant smoking is permitted, it may be easier for restaurant owners to call to mind those smoking customers they will lose by prohibiting smoking than to imagine nonsmoking customers whom they haven’t met whose patronage they will gain from a smoking ban. After living with a smoking ban, however, the reverse is true: the actual nonsmoking customers they will lose from permitting smoking are more salient than potential smoking customers they will gain. By shifting the composition of the baseline set of customers, a temporary ban can change the beliefs of the restaurant owners in a way that makes their behavior sticky.

Another example is the problem of forecasting one’s affect. The happiness literature shows that people adapt to new situations more quickly than they expect. Smokers who have no experience at nonsmoking restaurants may expect to be miserable.

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11 See notes 58–59 and accompanying text.

12 See note 68 and accompanying text.
at them and to take a long time to adjust to being unable to smoke; they therefore avoid all the nonsmoking restaurants when there are only a few of them. After living with a complete ban, however, they adjust to the experience (by not smoking for a period or stepping outside) more quickly than they predicted and are therefore willing occasionally to patronize nonsmoking restaurants. Although they still prefer smoking restaurants, their occasional patronage of nonsmoking restaurants means that more restaurants will stay nonsmoking. We explore these points more systematically below.

Thus, the domain we identify for temporary law, in which it is presumptively superior to permanent law, is when (1) it appears there are multiple equilibria and the status quo is trapped in an inefficient one and (2) there are informational barriers to identifying the superior equilibrium. We also consider some costs of temporary law that render it unsuitable in certain contexts.

This Article sits at the intersection of two different legal literatures. First, there are a handful of articles on temporary legislation. Professor Jacob Gersen has offered a positive political theory of temporary legislation, arguing that it advantages the legislature over the executive. As a normative matter, Gersen speculates that temporality might desirably spread decision costs over time in a way that might lead to better-informed regulation, particularly for newly recognized risks. Professor Yair Listokin identifies the advantages of experimenting with legal policy.

13 Gersen, 74 U Chi L Rev at 248 (cited in note 9).
14 See id.
15 See Yair Listokin, Learning through Policy Variation, 118 Yale L J 480, 522–33 (2008) (advocating the value of policy reversibility in cost-benefit analysis and arguing that, facing uncertainty, reversibility allows the policy maker to learn, retaining new policies that produce net benefits and abandoning those that produce net costs). See also Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres, and Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U Pa L Rev 929, 975–79 (2011) (recommending the use of legal experiments by changing law for limited and randomly selected subpopulations and observing the results); Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, An Options Approach to Agency Rulemaking, 65 Admin L Rev 881, 904–06 (2013) (recommending that agencies regulate so as to preserve future options and then commit to reevaluating past regulations and modifying them if appropriate to obtain greater future regulatory benefits); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in Cary Coglianese, ed, Regulatory Breakdown: The Crisis of Confidence in U.S. Regulation 86, 95–106 (Pennsylvania 2012); Rob van Gestel and Gijs van Dijck, Better Regulation through Experimental Legislation, 17 Eur Pub L 539, 539–44 (2011).
decide whether to renew the law, with or without modification.\footnote{See Listokin, 118 Yale L J at 522–33 (cited in note 15).} Policy makers should therefore choose highly variable policies when they can be easily reversed or altered and lower-variance policies when it will be more difficult to make changes after the fact.\footnote{See id at 522–26.}

These theories do not discuss the problem of path dependence; as a result, the rationales they provide for temporary law are more contingent. For Gersen and Listokin, there is always the alternative of enacting a permanent law and later repealing it if the results show the law to be a failure. So the choice between a formally permanent and temporary law is merely a matter of allocating the burden of future change on either the law’s opponents, who must secure repeal, or the law’s proponents, who must secure renewal. That is an interesting normative tradeoff, but it is entirely distinct from the rationale we explore.

When the argument for regulating is the existence of multiple equilibria and path dependence, the case for temporary law is less contingent. In this setting, one wants the law to lapse after a time not because it has failed, but in order to allow it to succeed. The law’s success cannot be judged while it is in effect, but only after it expires, when a new equilibrium does or does not emerge. If the new equilibrium is the same as the status quo ante, the rationale for regulation is rejected. If the new equilibrium is something different and better, the rationale is affirmed but the regulation is no longer necessary. If we are committed incrementalists and the costs of overcoming legislative inertia are sufficiently low, it might make sense for almost all laws to be temporary. But even if we reject incrementalism\footnote{For a shrewd analysis of its costs, see generally Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U Pa L Rev 815 (2010).} and the costs of overcoming legislative inertia are high, we would still argue for temporary law to address the problem of path dependence.

This Article also engages and extends a second literature: the project of behavioral economics to identify important policy implications of cognitive limitations and behavioral biases. Of course, rational-choice mechanisms can also create path dependence, as some of our examples will show. For that reason, the normative case for temporary law need not depend on the findings
of behavioral research. But we find that the most easily generalized reason for multiple equilibria and path dependence is the asymmetric effects of cognitive biases. Those biases will often push in favor of the status quo, so that two arbitrarily different starting points can produce two different equilibria. Only by accident will the bias favor the selection of the efficient equilibrium.

This Article fits broadly within the debate Professors Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler started with their defense of libertarian paternalism. In many (though not all) of the examples, the temporary law we explore is unquestionably paternalistic. Yet temporary paternalism is better for the libertarian than the permanent kind. It may even ultimately be less intrusive on liberty than some of the “nudges” Sunstein and Thaler defend. Beyond a simple temporal compromise, the possibility of temporary legislation forces greater intellectual honesty on those who advocate some restriction on liberty. If the advocate of regulation relies on the claim of multiple equilibria and path dependence, then she should presumptively favor merely temporary legislation. If, over time, temporary legislation exposes the general falsity of claims of path dependence, then it will strengthen the hand of the libertarian to resist even temporary paternalism. The final advantage of temporary law is that it may serve the value of liberty in this manner. A possible implication of our analysis (assuming no market failures other than path dependence) is that many laws, including many antismoking laws, should be repealed (after which we suspect there would remain far fewer smoking establishments than existed prior to the ban).

The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I we explain the behavioral forces that can lead to multiple equilibria and path dependence with a particular case study: bans on smoking in public places. In Part II we generalize from this example and describe the advantages and disadvantages of temporary legislation, focusing on its role in exposing situations of path dependence. Part III offers a suggestive empirical study of a temporary

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smoking ban, using the example of an actual (albeit unintended) temporary ban that governed Champaign, Illinois. Part IV extends the analysis to other examples, including seat belt regulation, affirmative action, traffic regulation, curfews, and bank holidays and trading circuit breakers.

I. MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND THE EXAMPLE OF SMOKING BEHAVIOR

Markets produce equilibria, and naïve free market advocates tend to assume that these equilibria are always efficient. But the fact that a competitive market has generated a particular equilibrium does not mean that the equilibrium is socially optimal, even if the equilibrium is the product of voluntary exchange with reasonably low transaction costs. Rather, both behavioral biases and rational-choice mechanisms can create situations in which multiple equilibria are possible. The choice of equilibrium in such situations is then path dependent: different starting points and histories generate different behavioral patterns, even when other underlying parameters are constant. When the status quo is trapped in an inferior equilibrium, temporary regulation may work to move the population to a better equilibrium.

We develop these points using the controversy surrounding smoking regulation. We have in mind the laws that have increasingly prohibited smoking in various public and now private spaces: hospitals, airports, shopping malls, stadia, theatres, restaurants, bars, hotels, cars carrying child passengers, and apartments. Despite their popularity, there is in most cases a reasonable libertarian/free market argument against the regulation.

In this Part, we use only the example of smoking bans, though we shall later generalize the analysis.

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21 See, for example, Lambert, Regulation at 34 (cited in note 8). These specific arguments are applications of the analysis of market libertarians stated in classic works. See, for example, Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose 222–27 (Harcourt 1980); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 220–33 (Chicago 1960).
A. The Libertarian/Economic Argument against Smoking Bans

Smoking bans have become increasingly popular in the United States and around the world in the years since California enacted the first ban in 1994. As of 2011, twenty-five states and the District of Columbia had enacted statewide smoke-free laws governing workplaces, restaurants, and/or bars. A growing number of cities and counties across the country have also taken action, and one source reports that as of 2004, 2,300 municipalities have bans in some form, up from 89 in 1985.

The spread of smoking bans has resulted from a number of factors. One is the growing awareness of the health dangers associated with smoking. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that 19.0 percent of Americans smoked as of 2011, down from 33.2 percent in 1980. As the percentage of voters who are smokers has declined, it has become easier for smoking bans to pass. Finally, the spread of smoking bans is...

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22 Ronald Bayer and James Colgrove, Children and Bystanders First: The Ethics and Politics of Tobacco Control in the United States, in Feldman and Bayer, eds, Unfiltered 8, 25 (cited in note 8).
24 Bayer and Colgrove, Children and Bystanders First at 8 (cited in note 22).
27 Furthermore, there are a nontrivial number of smokers who support smoking bans, most likely as a commitment device to help them quit. See Joni Hersch, Smoking Restrictions as a Self-Control Mechanism, 31 J Risk & Uncertainty 5, 18–20 (2005) (finding that smokers who plan to quit and especially those who failed to quit on a previous occasion support public smoking bans as an aid to quitting). See also Silke Anger, Michael Kvasnicka, and Thomas Siedler, One Last Puff? Public Smoking Bans and Smoking Behavior, 30 J Health Econ 591, 593–97 (2011) (finding that public smoking...
also an example of what political scientists call “policy diffusion,” in which jurisdictions copy the policies of other jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{28}

As smoking bans have spread, there has been increased debate over their consequences. Proponents of bans believe that they contribute to the declining rates of smoking and point to evidence that bans have been associated with health improvement.\textsuperscript{29} While some of the evidence is contested, it is safe to say that the vast majority of public health analysts support smoking bans.

Opponents, on the other hand, argue that bans interfere with individual liberty and dispute the underlying science. Libertarians and some smokers tend to view smoking bans as paternalistic regulations interfering with liberty and market processes.\textsuperscript{30} A key issue in this debate has been the nature and extent of the externalities associated with smoking. Ban proponents have had great success in exploiting the issue of secondhand smoke. They have framed the issue using the language of rights, arguing that smokers’ rights end at the nose of bans reduce the incidence of the smoking habit among some subpopulations in Germany.

\textsuperscript{28} See Shipan and Volden, 52 Am J Polit Sci at 840 (cited in note 20). More specifically, “diffusion” refers to the idea that the probability of a jurisdiction adopting a given policy increases as other jurisdictions adopt the policy. See generally Allan M. Brandt, \textit{Difference and Diffusion: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on the Rise of Anti-tobacco Policies}, in Feldman and Bayer, eds, \textit{Unfiltered} 255 (cited in note 8); Marmor and Lieberman, \textit{Tobacco Control in Comparative Perspective} at 285–86 (cited in note 25). The effect has been observed in a wide variety of domestic and international settings. It may be attributable to learning across jurisdictions, or changes in costs and benefits associated with particular policies (for example, losing business to a neighboring jurisdiction that has adopted a more desirable policy). See Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons, \textit{On Waves, Clusters and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework}, 598 Annals Am Acad Poli & Soc Sci 33, 39–42 (2005) (describing various channels of policy diffusion). In the case of smoking bans there also appear to be direct international pressures at work as well. See Brandt, \textit{Difference and Diffusion} at 270–73 (cited in note 28) (international enforcement).

\textsuperscript{29} For example, a study conducted in Pueblo, Colorado, showed that the incidence of acute myocardial infarction—that is, heart attacks—declined after a smoking ban was adopted within the city limits. Carl Bartecchi, et al, \textit{Reduction in the Incidence of Acute Myocardial Infarction Associated with a Citywide Smoking Ordinance}, 114 Circulation 1490, 1494–95 (2006).

nonsmokers. Smoking bans are needed, it is argued, to protect the employees of restaurants and bars who have no choice but to be exposed. The argument has had a powerful effect in changing public attitudes toward smoking bans, though it has some weaknesses, as we explain below.

Libertarians counter that the vast majority of negative health effects associated with smoking are felt by the smoker herself and that the science on secondhand effects is much weaker. Their view is that the “regulation of cigarette use has far outstripped scientific concerns about risk to others.” They also raise the idea of a slippery slope. If one can justify paternalistic policies by the simple fact that they may save lives, then government can prohibit any risky activity that people freely choose—mountain climbing, playing football, eating fatty foods, working in an underground mine, or being a couch potato—all at the expense of liberty.

More relevant for our purposes is a second point. Even assuming secondhand smoke is dangerous, if people are fully informed, they will efficiently sort themselves by their preferences. In the absence of transactions costs, the Coase Theorem implies that voluntary exchange produces an efficient outcome. There always are transaction costs, but if they are low, the standard argument is that voluntary exchange allows an outcome closer to efficiency than an outcome imposed by government. First, employees who dislike smoking may demand a wage premium to work in a smoking establishment, as the economic evidence

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31 See Feldman and Bayer, Introduction at 18–27 (cited in note 8).
32 See id.
33 See Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer, Conclusion: Lessons from the Comparative Study of Tobacco Control, in Feldman and Bayer, eds, Unfiltered 292, 292 (cited in note 8) (“The identification of vulnerable third parties held to be in need of protection has been a crucial justification for anti-tobacco policy and advocacy.”).
34 See Joseph L. Bast and Maureen Martin, Why Defend Smokers?, in Joseph L. Bast, Please Don’t Poop in My Salad and Other Essays against the War on Smoking 3, 6 (Heartland 2006); Joseph L. Bast, Leave Those Poor Smokers Alone!, in Bast, Please Don’t Poop in My Salad 11, 12–13 (cited in note 34).
35 Brandt, Difference and Diffusion at 261 (cited in note 28).
36 See Joel Sherman, Foreword, in Bast, Please Don’t Poop in My Salad v, vii (cited in note 34).
37 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 15–19 (1960). The article states no formal theorem but the modern understanding is that it proposes that, “when transaction costs are zero, an efficient result will be reached, regardless of the initial assignment of legal entitlements.” Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 Harv L Rev 1471, 1472 n 1 (2013).
shows they do in other industries. 38 If working in a smoking establishment is like working in high-rise construction or a nuclear power plant, one must be paid extra in return for the health risks one accepts. Second, consumers who dislike smoking may patronize nonsmoking bars or other establishments. Smoking-averse consumers will presumably require some compensation for patronizing a smoking establishment, such as better prices or superior service.

The argument works best in competitive markets such as motels, restaurants, and bars. It works less well for less competitive facilities such as airports and stadia, which often form local monopolies. With competition, the standard prediction is that the market will eventually produce a range of smoking policies to reflect consumer tastes. 39 Left alone, establishments might eventually innovate by using sophisticated filtering technology to create separate spaces for each type or by charging customers for smoking (passing savings on to nonsmokers by charging less for other goods and services). Nonsmokers who care strongly about avoiding exposure to secondhand smoke will find restaurants and bars that cater to their preferences. Smokers who care strongly about smoking in a particular establishment will find the same. We observe this kind of differentiation in hotel rooms, in that hotels reserve some rooms for nonsmokers and some hotels choose to be entirely smoke-free. 40 There was not much evidence of nonsmoking bars or restaurants before the bans went into effect, but arguably that kind of specialization would have occurred on its own, in response to changing preferences, had the law not intervened.

Thus, the libertarian argument against a smoking ban is that, if establishments are free to decide whether to permit


39 See Lambert, 29 Regulation at 40 (cited in note 8).

40 See, for example, Millennium Hotels & Resorts, Millennium Knickerbocker Hotel Chicago, online at http://www.millenniumhotels.com/millenniumchicago/hotel-amenities/guest-services.html (visited Mar 2, 2014) (100 percent nonsmoking hotel).
smoking, competitive markets supply the one and only distribution of smoking and nonsmoking establishments that is consistent with consumer preferences and budgets.\(^{41}\) Note that this efficiency argument is abstract and structural. There is no effort to estimate each of the many costs and benefits of the pre-ban smoking equilibrium and then to compare them to the costs and benefits of a different outcome the law imposes. Instead, the claim is that the pre-ban outcome is most likely to be efficient, given that the structure of competitive markets and free exchange produces the optimal outcome.\(^{42}\)

The libertarian critic can go one step further. The argument so far has been about simple efficiency—the maximization of wealth. Yet, in this context, it is plausible that free market exchange maximizes not only wealth, but also welfare. A social welfare function can be sensitive to distribution,\(^{43}\) yet nonsmokers in the United States (at least) tend to be more affluent than smokers.\(^{44}\) The implications of this observation are significant and easily overlooked. One cannot explain the fact that establishments overwhelmingly permitted smoking (before a ban) by the relative wealth of smokers. Instead, the fact that many establishments chose to permit smoking implies that the poorer smokers outbid the wealthier nonsmokers only because the former’s preferences for smoking are more intense than the latter’s aversion to smoking (even considering the latter’s concern about their own health). Distributional concerns are ordinarily thought to justify laws that promote the welfare of the less well-off at the expense of the more well-off, not the other way around.

\(^{41}\) There is, of course, a separate strand of libertarianism according to which it is only freedom of choice that matters, not whether a given arrangement will actually maximize welfare. That strand of thinking would oppose any smoking ban for the simple fact that it restricts individual choice, irrespective of the consequences. We focus primarily on the consequentialist strand of libertarianism, which we believe to be dominant.


\(^{43}\) See generally Matthew D. Adler, *Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis* 307 (Oxford 2012) (arguing for a continuous prioritarianism that gives additional weight to the welfare of the least well off); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, *Fairness versus Welfare* 28–38 (Harvard 2002) (noting that a social welfare function need not be utilitarian but can give weight to equality of welfare).

There are, of course, paternalistic arguments that the smokers are making an error about their own interests (or that satisfaction of uninformed preferences do not count in the social welfare function)\(^{45}\), but the goal of this Article is to illustrate a different critique, one that avoids this maximally paternalistic move.

Figure 1 illustrates the libertarian analysis. In this context, an equilibrium refers to a percentage of smoking and nonsmoking establishments (restaurants, bars, motels, etc.) that is stable because no establishment gains by switching by itself from its current state (smoking or nonsmoking) to the opposite state. The \(x\)-axis is the percentage of establishments of this type (restaurants, bars, casinos, etc.) that permit smoking. The \(y\)-axis is the net revenue of an establishment. The gray line shows the revenue from operating an establishment that permits smoking, which varies with the percentage of all establishments of the same type that permit smoking. At the left, there are no other smoking establishments, so the revenue for being the one smoking establishment is high. At the far right, with the maximum number of smoking competitors, revenue is at its lowest. The curve might be drawn to decline continuously or, as here, to have a flat middle segment where the revenues for one smoking establishment are insensitive to the number of other smoking establishments.

The black curve shows the revenues for nonsmoking establishments of the same sort. The shape and relative location of the curve reveal two assumptions. One is that, in this community, smokers are willing to pay more for the opportunity to smoke in such establishments than nonsmokers are willing to pay for the opportunity to be in a smoke-free establishment. That is why the nonsmoking revenue curve is usually lower than the smoking revenue curve. Yet, second, there comes a point where the percentage of smoking establishments is so high that there is a niche nonsmoking market in which the remaining establishments earn more net revenue by attracting a large percentage of the nonsmokers.

\(^{45}\) See, for example, Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, *Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted*, 29 J Legal Stud 1105, 1128–33 (2000) (defending a welfarist cost-benefit analysis that values the satisfaction of undistorted rather than actual preferences by imagining what preferences would be if individuals were fully informed).
Where these curves intersect, the revenue from operating a smoking establishment is equal to the revenue from operating a nonsmoking establishment. This point is an equilibrium because, from there, no smoking establishment can gain by switching to nonsmoking and no nonsmoking bar can gain by switching to smoking. From this point, if a smoking establishment became nonsmoking, its choice would cause a decline in the percentage of establishments permitting smoking and, therefore, its revenue is represented by a point to the left of the intersection along the black line. That part of the line is below the intersection, meaning the establishment would lose money by switching to nonsmoking. A similar point is true of a nonsmoking establishment that changes to smoking: the increase in the percentage of smoking establishments means that its revenue is represented by a point to the right of the intersection along the gray curve. That too is a move downward from the intersection, representing a loss in revenues.

The intersection is the only equilibrium because, at every other point along the x-axis, some establishment wants to switch its smoking policy. To the left of the equilibrium, there is always room for some establishment to increase revenue by switching from nonsmoking to smoking. To the right of the equilibrium,
there is always room for some establishment to increase revenue by switching from smoking to nonsmoking. As drawn, Figure 1 shows an equilibrium with a relatively high percentage of smoking establishments (more than 80 percent). The structural argument for the efficiency of this outcome is that it is the only possible product of free exchange.

B. The Path-Dependence Critique of the Libertarian Argument

From an economic perspective, the libertarian is almost certainly correct in saying that the optimal amount of smoking establishments in any community is greater than zero. We might say the same about any risky activity that adults choose to engage in. There are health costs to skydiving, boxing, driving in bad weather, eating cheeseburgers, and working high-rise construction, but for some individuals the benefits outweigh those costs.

Yet it is quite possible that the libertarian is wrong about the status quo representing the only equilibrium. Instead, there are many reasons to expect path dependence, which complicates the case for efficiency. The multiple-equilibrium argument says that the equilibrium we observed before smoking bans went into effect was not the only equilibrium that could exist under that legal regime. Instead, it was influenced by the starting point: high rates of smoking, little concern about the health hazards of secondhand smoke, and a social norm of deferring to smokers. Had we instead started from a low rate of smoking, strong concerns about passive smoking health hazards, and a norm of deferring to nonsmokers, we might have reached a different equilibrium, with more nonsmoking establishments. Importantly, the argument assumes we are holding constant preferences about smoking. The multiple-equilibrium argument is that those preferences can produce different equilibrium behaviors. There is therefore no reason to assume that the one we observe is efficient.

Figure 2 illustrates. As before, the curves represent the net revenue from operating a smoking or nonsmoking establishment, which varies by the percentage of other establishments that are smoking. The revenue curves here, however, cross not once but three times. The intersection on the left is a low-smoking equilibrium (LSE); the intersection on the right is a high-smoking equilibrium (HSE); the middle intersection is not an equilibrium.
FIGURE 2. MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA OF SMOKING ESTABLISHMENTS

First, let us verify that the intersections on the left and right are in fact equilibria. The LSE on the left is an equilibrium because, at this point, no smoking establishment can gain by switching to nonsmoking and no nonsmoking bar can gain by switching to smoking. If a smoking establishment became nonsmoking, its choice would cause a decline in the percentage of establishments permitting smoking and therefore its revenue is represented by a point to the left of the intersection along the black line. The line is falling at that point, so the switch causes revenue to decline. If a nonsmoking establishment switched to smoking, it would move to the right on the gray line, which also lowers revenue. For the same reason, the HSE on the right is an equilibrium.

Now consider why no other point on the graph is an equilibrium. At any point on the x-axis where one revenue curve is higher than the other, firms on the lower curve want to switch their smoking policy in order to increase their revenues. To the left of the LSE, the revenue of smoking establishments is higher, so some establishments want to shift to smoking. To the right of the HSE, the opposite is true—nonsmoking revenue is higher and some establishments want to shift to nonsmoking.

What about that third intersection, the one in the middle? For convenience, we will refer to this intersection as an “inflection
point” (even though there is more than one inflection point in Figure 2). This point lacks the stability of an equilibrium because any move away from it increases revenue: a switch to smoking moves to the right on the gray curve, which is an upward move; a switch to nonsmoking moves to the left and up on the black curve. The significance of the inflection point is that it represents the border between the attractive forces of the two equilibria. If the initial distribution of establishments is to the left of the inflection point, firms gain from switching to nonsmoking and the establishment owners will switch smoking policies until they reach the LSE. If the initial distribution is to the right of the inflection point, the establishments move to the HSE. (At the inflection point, either move is equally possible.)

Note the resulting path dependence. If the distribution of establishments begins just slightly to the left of the inflection point, the result is the LSE. If the initial distribution is just slightly to the right of the inflection point, the result is the HSE. Where we end up depends on arbitrary differences in where we start. Yet if free exchange produces both the LSE and HSE, then we can no longer rely on the structural argument for efficiency. That the status quo is the product of free exchange is no longer evidence of its efficiency, given that there is a very different outcome that free exchange could just as easily produce, given an arbitrarily different starting point.

The fact that the LSE exists also does not prove it is efficient. To choose between the two equilibria requires some independent normative evaluation. But note that the existence of multiple equilibria invalidates the structural argument for the efficiency of the current outcome because we cannot say the current level of smoking-permitted establishments is the necessary outcome of individuals freely pursuing their own ends. Instead, those preferences and opportunities are consistent with more than one behavioral outcome. Because we happened to start out at a high smoking rate and higher tolerance rate for smoking, we end up with something close to that.

Once there is no structural reason to favor the HSE, it is easy to imagine a series of normative arguments for the LSE. Perhaps the internalization of smoking externalities is never perfect, as some smoke escapes the confines of one space into an

46 This is not necessarily the precise mathematical usage, but it captures the idea. One might also call this intersection the “tipping point.”
adjoining “no-smoking” place, where people have not consented to being exposed. If so, there is less such “leakage” with an LSE than an HSE. Perhaps the LSE causes more smokers to voluntarily quit, which desirably reduces externalities a competitive market doesn’t address, such as the littering of discarded butts, the spread of fires caused by smoking, or the choice of parents to smoke around their children. There might be no economic-efficiency or welfare basis for choosing between the two equilibria, in which case it is difficult to object to using some other criterion or criteria at least as a tiebreaker, and noneconomic criteria might favor the LSE. Perhaps Aristotelian virtue ethics or the “capabilities approach” opposes any consumption that approaches or constitutes an addiction, regardless of other consequences. This Article is not attempting to contribute to any such normative analysis, but only to note that once there are multiple equilibria, there could be good normative reasons to prefer some outcome other than the status quo.

Thus, if the LSE is superior to the HSE, note the implications for law. First, as observed in the Introduction, if we had enough information to identify the location of the LSE, we could use law to reach it directly by licensing the number of smoking establishments the LSE represents. We can now add a similar observation about the inflection point. If we have enough information to identify the location of this dividing line, we would not need to know where the LSE is in order to ensure its emergence. As long as the law drives the percentage of smoking establishments down to a level below (to the left of) the inflection point, more establishments will choose to disallow smoking until the percentage reaches the LSE.

Yet if we do not know with confidence where the LSE or the inflection point is, then a permanent law may misfire. One risk is that the government licenses too many smoking establishments, at some level to the right of the inflection point (but to the left of the HSE). The law thus seeks to impose a nonequilibrium number of smoking establishments by prohibiting smoking in establishments that lack a license. There are two costs. First,

we never reach the LSE. We permanently enshrine a number of smoking establishments that is higher (or lower) than optimal. Second, to impose a nonequilibrium outcome requires enforcement and incurs the associated costs. At any point to the right of the inflection point, but left of the HSE, there are nonsmoking establishments that would gain revenue by allowing smoking, so those without licenses will have a constant incentive to violate the smoking ban. The costs of constant enforcement might make this scheme worse than simply allowing the HSE, which involves no enforcement costs.

The parallel risk to permanent law is that the government licenses too few smoking establishments, at some level to the left of the LSE. Again, by permanently enforcing a below-optimal smoking level, society must incur two costs. One is the inefficiency of frustrating stronger preferences for smoking (as well as the distribution of wealth away from poorer smokers). The other cost is enforcement, since at any point to the left of the LSE, there are nonsmoking establishments that would gain by allowing smoking, so those without licenses have a constant incentive to violate the ban.

As a result, there are key advantages to giving a smoking law an expiration date. One is equilibrium location. Once the law expires, establishments will switch to smoking up to the LSE but not beyond it. A second advantage is reduced enforcement costs because the LSE is self-sustaining; at this point, no establishment owner gains from switching to a policy allowing smoking. So we save on enforcement costs and we gain whatever normative advantage the LSE might have over the HSE.

Temporality also offers equilibrium verification. There is always some chance that we have made a fundamental mistake because our information is erroneous and there is no LSE. If the economic libertarian is correct and the HSE is the only and efficient equilibrium, then when the law expires the establishments will switch back to smoking up to the level of the HSE. We will have avoided the costs of erroneously using law to impose an inefficient outcome. Indeed, when we said above that we might not know where the LSE or inflection point is, this includes the case in which we are confident where the LSE or inflection point would be if they existed, but there is some possibility that they do not exist. The expiration of the law completes the experiment that reveals whether the LSE exists and, if so, where it is located.
Now we turn to the question we have postponed: Why would there ever be path dependence and multiple smoking equilibria?

C. Rational and Behavioral Mechanisms Creating Path Dependence

We do not claim to offer all the reasons for multiple equilibria in the number of smoking/nonsmoking establishments. We wish only to illustrate the plausibility of the argument so we can illustrate the virtues of temporary law. We divide our discussion into rational-choice explanations and behavioral explanations for path dependence. We focus on the example of bars, but most of the points we make could apply to apartments, restaurants, theatres, or other venues. Smoking bans are an obvious example because, until recently, nearly every legal jurisdiction allowed smoking in bars, and more importantly none had previously banned smoking.

1. Rational-choice mechanisms for path dependence in the number of smoking establishments.

If individuals are rational, why would path dependence occur? A mundane story is the transition cost involved in switching smoking policies. When a bar goes from smoking to nonsmoking, the owner must put up signs, create an outdoor space for smokers, and train the staff while replacing staff members who quit on account of the new rules. The owner might also have to spend money advertising for new customers. The immediate costs of switching might exceed the discounted stream of higher revenue from switching. For that reason, the switch is not efficient, even if, absent switching costs, the bar would generate gains in social welfare by being nonsmoking. For the rest of our examples, a switch might be efficient.

Of greater interest are network effects. The story here has to be that for one establishment, adopting a nonsmoking policy alone will cause it to lose more customers than it gains, even

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50 Id at 133 ("Arizona passed the first statewide [secondhand smoking] legislation in 1973, banning smoking in all indoor theaters, art museums, libraries, elevators, and buses used by the public.").

51 For a review of the economic literature, see Farrell and Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-in at 1971–72 (cited in note 7).
though if a group of establishments adopted the policy at the same time they would gain more customers than they lost. But why might it be true that the marginal smoking bar would not gain from going nonsmoking if there is an equilibrium with many more nonsmoking bars?

There are two kinds of social interdependencies that render this outcome plausible. First is the lumpiness of consumption represented by barhopping.\(^{52}\) Suppose there is a twenty-something crowd that craves variety and therefore enjoys starting at one bar and moving through three or four more over the course of a night. Suppose also that there is currently only one nonsmoking bar in the geographic area with twenty bars. Finally, let us suppose that one of the primary costs the nonsmokers perceive from patronizing the smoking bar is that the smoke exposure, by the end of the night, causes their clothes and hair to smell bad.\(^{53}\) This is no small matter if one’s coat or clothing requires dry cleaning. But imagine that the cost of tobacco-smoke exposure is not linear, but subject to a strong threshold effect: after the first thirty minutes of exposure in a smoking bar, additional minutes of exposure add almost nothing to the bad smell.

Now consider the effect of the Marginal Bar (the economist’s favorite drinking establishment)\(^ {54}\) switching from smoking to nonsmoking. If a night of barhopping involves going to four or five bars, then it will make no difference to nonsmokers that the Marginal Bar becomes nonsmoking. Even if they patronize both of the two nonsmoking bars, they will go to two or three smoking bars and still come home with the bad smell. Thus, the nonsmoking feature attracts no more nonsmoking barhoppers, but it does drive away all the smoking barhoppers. The Marginal Bar would not want to make that switch by itself.

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\(^{52}\) It is difficult to estimate how common barhopping or pub crawling is. There is a Guinness World Record for it. See Guinness Book of World Records, *Most People on a Pub Crawl* (2013), online at http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/records-3000/most-people-on-a-pub-crawl (visited Mar 2, 2014).


The clothing of a person who is exposed to tobacco smoke for even relatively short periods of time can absorb chemicals that produce a foul odor that will accompany that person for the remainder of the day. The only cure is to launder the clothing, shower, and wash the hair.

\(^{54}\) There is in fact a bar with this name located in Portugal. See Marginal Bar, online at https://www.facebook.com/MarginalBar (visited Mar 2, 2014).
Nevertheless, there could also be a low-smoking equilibrium, one with, say, ten (of the twenty) bars being nonsmoking. With that many nonsmoking bars, the nonsmokers could at the same time satisfy their desire for barhopping and their desire to avoid the bad smell of smoke exposure. Suppose the Marginal Bar is one of the ten nonsmoking bars. If it switches from nonsmoking to smoking, it will gain just a few of the smoking bar hoppers (now spread out over eleven bars) but lose all the nonsmoking bar hoppers. The Marginal Bar would not want to make that switch by itself.55

Now consider a second network-effects story: social sorting. Imagine that people go to only one bar per night, but that they go with or meet up with a group of friends and acquaintances, perhaps from work. When nineteen of the twenty bars are smoking, the groups that form contain smokers and nonsmokers. There being so few options for nonsmoking bars, the nonsmokers feel it would be too demanding to ask everyone to meet at that one nonsmoking bar and therefore the smokers always select a smoking bar. The Marginal Bar realizes that nothing significant will change if it becomes the second nonsmoking bar. The nonsmokers will still feel that there are so few choices of nonsmoking bars that it would be unreasonable to insist on going to one of them. The Marginal Bar will therefore not make the change by itself.

Nonetheless, there could be a low-smoking equilibrium where ten of the twenty bars are nonsmoking. With half the bars nonsmoking, requesting to meet at a nonsmoking bar is no more constraining than requesting to meet at a smoking bar. Thus, the nonsmokers will speak up. There are three ways the low-smoking equilibrium might then be stable. One is that the group bargains over what kind of bar to patronize and the nonsmoking bar wins a substantial fraction of the time. Perhaps the group alternates evenly between the smoking and nonsmoking bars. We have said nothing up to this point about what proportion of the group is nonsmoking. But we might think that if the majority

55 If transaction costs were sufficiently low, a group of bars might contract with each other to jointly switch to nonsmoking. But various transactions costs might block this solution. First, there are costs of coordinating among the different owners and each owner might seek to avoid these costs by waiting for another owner to take the lead in coordinating them. Second, the bar owners might themselves lack the information to know the location of the other equilibrium, that is, how many bars need to jointly switch to achieve the joint gains. Third, there could be concerns about antitrust liability from competitors agreeing jointly to the terms offered to customers.
of the group is nonsmoking, then it will patronize nonsmoking bars most or all of the time. A second possibility is that the group breaks up. Now that there is substantial choice, the difference between smokers and nonsmokers is sufficient to cause the work groups to form around that choice. The nonsmokers now always patronize nonsmoking bars. If we allow even more endogeneity, we arrive at a third possibility: some of the smokers find that the inconvenience of exiting the group or suffering in a nonsmoking bar is sufficient to cause them to quit smoking.56 This point reinforces the first two—increasing the bargaining power of the nonsmokers to either spend more time in the nonsmoking bar or to stop inviting smokers to join them.

There might be other network-effect mechanisms as well, such as the effects of such policies on the labor supply of bartenders and other bar employees. A nonsmoking policy is costly for employees who smoke. Most obviously, some nonsmoking policies require employees to exit the building to smoke rather than to smoke in a designated room (out of fear that air circulation will then drive away nonsmoking customers). Requiring employees to smoke outside imposes costs when the weather is unpleasant or when the nearest smoking spot is next to the garbage bin or in a poorly lit alley. Even if the nonsmoking establishment allows smoking employees to smoke inside, they may impose limits on where the smoking may occur, perhaps limited to time in the break room, rather than allowing a waiter or bartender to keep a lit cigarette in an ashtray accessible to the workspace.

Now consider how employees will sort themselves. If we start with all bars allowing smoking, then employee smokers will have no reason to avoid working at bars. By contrast, nonsmoker workers will disproportionately sort themselves into jobs other than at bars. The nonsmoker who works in his own home need not be exposed to smoke. One who works outside as a gardener, door-to-door salesperson, or sidewalk vendor will not have to worry about intense exposure. One who drives a cab can usually decide to forbid smoking in the cab. And almost any factory or office building will have less intense buildup of smoke than a bar, pool hall, or dance club. The point is that, when all establishments permit smoking, the nonsmokers will not be

56 See note 27 and accompanying text.
spread evenly but will be concentrated in those industries with less intense smoke exposure.

Suppose also that the labor supply is “sticky” in the short run because those who are already have a job working in a bar have lower search costs for other bar jobs than those who are currently working in another occupation. That is not to say that the labor market for bar workers is fixed; some people might move from nonbar jobs to bar jobs. But given two workers of equal marginal productivity at serving alcohol, the one already employed in this occupation is more likely to apply for desirable positions in the occupation. This might be true for various reasons, the simplest being information: those working in other occupations are less likely to have the information about the best available bar jobs, so that they are less likely to apply. Another is human-capital investments: when all or most bars are smoking, the people who take bartending classes (learning to mix drinks) are more likely to be smokers.

Finally, assume that a bar experiences lower wage costs the larger the pool of potential applicants for an offered job. If there are five applicants for every job, instead of two, the employer will either be able to pay a lower wage or to hire a more productive worker.

Given these points, there will be network effects. If almost all bars are smoking, employee selection means that the average bar will have lots of smoking employees and, when there is turnover, will be able to draw on a labor pool that has many smokers (in both cases, compared to the percentage of smokers in the general working population). If all the bars are nonsmoking, selection works the opposite way so that the average bar will have relatively more nonsmoking employees and job applicants. In either case, the effect in the short run is to raise the labor costs of operating against the industry standard. With all smoking bars, if the Marginal Bar switches to nonsmoking, it will not only incur switching costs, it will draw on a smaller pool of potential employees than its competitors, which will raise its labor costs. With all nonsmoking bars, if the Marginal Bar switches to smoking, it will incur higher employee costs than its competitors.

In short, it is not difficult to imagine network effects impacting the decisions of bar owners regarding smoking policies. The result is multiple equilibria, with path dependence affecting the equilibrium that actually emerges. The point is general and
applies outside the context of smoking bans. It is well known in game theory that collective action and coordination games can create multiple equilibria, but we will attempt to illustrate the point with some specificity. Imagine a neighborhood with local amenities (a nice park, some good restaurants) but also a substantial crime problem. Relatively few people visit the neighborhood after dark, and this allows criminals to target the few people who venture there with relative impunity. The neighborhood is in an inefficient low-traffic equilibrium. If the number of people frequenting the neighborhood after dark increased substantially, the streets would be crowded and criminals could no longer operate. This would be a high-traffic equilibrium. However, no individual would rationally begin frequenting the neighborhood without knowing that others will as well. If the costs of coordination are high, the neighborhood will remain in the low-traffic equilibrium. And if the neighborhood were able to transition to the high-traffic equilibrium, that equilibrium might be stable as well. If the number of people who frequent the neighborhood is substantially greater than the number necessary to deter criminals, no individual will have a rational reason to change behavior, so long as the neighborhood remains a desirable destination.

Signaling mechanisms can also create multiple stable equilibria. One canonical example is seat belt use. In a society in which almost no one wears a seat belt, the social meaning of a passenger’s buckling up is to insult the driver. Using a safety device that no one else uses signals a belief that the driver is incompetent. Drivers who use a seat belt signal to passengers that they know themselves to be bad drivers. Either signal raises the costs of wearing a seatbelt, which helps to sustain a low-use equilibrium. By contrast, if almost everyone in society uses a seat belt, the use is no longer insulting. The passenger does not signal distrust of the current driver, nor does the driver signal doubts of his own competence, merely by using a safety precaution almost everyone uses. The lower costs of this social meaning can sustain a high-use equilibrium.

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2. Behavioral mechanisms for path dependence in the number of smoking establishments.

Now we turn from network externalities to behavioral biases. Returning to the smoking example, we consider biases that might affect three different groups: bar owners, employees, and customers.

When a bar owner is considering whether to switch from allowing smoking to prohibiting it (or the reverse), that owner will necessarily weigh the current customers she will lose if she switches against the hypothetical future customers she might gain. However, as noted above, the bar owner will likely suffer from the availability heuristic. The customers that will be lost are psychologically available because they are current customers—the bar owner sees them and may even know them personally. The customers who might be gained from the switch are not available; by definition, they never (or rarely) set foot in the bar. The availability heuristic is the tendency to overestimate the numbers of things (or people) that are psychologically available and underestimate the numbers of things that are not. So bar owners will likely overestimate the number of customers they will lose from switching and underestimate the number of customers they might gain. As with most biases, changing the status quo would reverse the direction of the bias. If a bar were already nonsmoking, current (nonsmoking) customers would be more available than potential smoking customers, and bar owners would overestimate the costs of switching to allow smoking.

The same effect might be triggered by risk aversion or loss aversion, which is the tendency to fear losses more than one values gains. Switching from permitting to prohibiting smoking would involve possible gains and losses of customers, and a typical bar owner would likely fear losing current customers more than she would value the prospect of gaining additional ones. But once a bar has become nonsmoking, the owner would

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59 Id at 228–30 (explaining how the availability heuristic can arise).

view a switch back to allowing smoking as bringing possible losses to which she is again averse.61

Present bias or hyperbolic discounting on the part of a bar owner could equally cause a stable but suboptimal equilibrium to develop. Recall that there are immediate costs in switching from smoking to nonsmoking, even if there are eventual net gains. A bar owner might want to put up signs, create an outdoor space for smokers, spend money advertising for new nonsmoking customers, and retrain new employees as smoking employees quit in anticipation of the new rule. A large body of economic literature shows that, when faced with decisions of this nature, with immediate costs and future benefits, many people procrastinate.62 That is, even though the benefits discounted by their ordinary discount rate (the one they use when comparing the costs or benefits of two future events) exceed the costs, the immediate costs loom larger, as the future was discounted at an inconsistently high rate when compared to an immediate cost. As a result, bar owners keep delaying the costly investment, even though they will not regret the investment if they make it. If an owner is “present biased” in this sense, he or she will postpone investing in a profitable switch to nonsmoking status, but will not switch back once the investment is made.

Finally, a bar owner might also fall prey to the sunk cost fallacy: the desire not to “waste” resources that have already been spent even if it would be in the individual’s interests to do so.63

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For instance, a bar owner might have made smoking-specific investments, such as installing a high-quality ventilation system or purchasing ashtrays or a cigarette vending machine. Going smoke-free would mean wasting these resources. This is yet another mechanism by which a bar owner can become tied to the status quo long past the point at which it ceases to be to her advantage.

Employees might also suffer from relevant cognitive biases. Perhaps most important is the endowment effect, which is the human tendency to overvalue the things (including rights and privileges) that one already possesses. When an employee can smoke at work, the entitlement to smoke seems more valuable than it would if the employee were not allowed to smoke at work. This will cause smokers to care a great deal if their workplaces transition from smoking to smoke-free—more than they would care about transitions in the opposite direction, in which nonsmoking workplaces (where workers are not already endowed with the right to smoke) begin to allow smoking. The reverse is also true. Nonsmokers would place a higher value on holding onto a smoke-free workplace than transitioning from a smoking workplace to a smoke-free one. This means that workers will fight harder to hold onto whatever arrangement is currently in place. Employers who switch from smoking to nonsmoking or the reverse will incur significant costs, either losing employees or being forced to compensate them for the change. The result will be to entrench the status quo.

Lastly, customers might also be subject to cognitive biases in favor of the status quo that could lead to multiple equilibria. Consider first the problem of affective forecasting. Humans have notorious difficulty at predicting how much they will enjoy a given experience or circumstance. Imagine then that we are

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walk away from sunk costs, irrationally ignoring the marginal costs and benefits of additional action.

64 See Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 5 J Econ Persp at 194–99 (cited in note 60) (describing and identifying the endowment effect).

65 See Frank Radoosevich II, No Butts about It: Urbana, Ill., Adopts Smoking Ordinance, Daily Illini (Aug 2, 2006) (quoting waitress as saying “employees have been taking it worse than customers” after the imposition of the smoking ban). See also Interview 22 (May 2, 2007) (on file with authors) (employee turnover after smoking ban).

66 See Timothy D. Wilson and Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing What to Want, 14 Current Directions Psychological Sci 131, 131 (2005) (“Research on affective forecasting has shown that people routinely mispredict how much pleasure or displeasure future events will bring and, as a result, sometimes work to bring about events that do not maximize their happiness.”); David A. Schkade and Daniel Kahneman, Does
in a high-smoking equilibrium, with nearly 100 percent of bars permitting smoking. Nonsmokers might not realize how much they would enjoy going to smoke-free bars. As a result, they might not agitate for nonsmoking bars either publicly—by asking bar owners to ban smoking—or privately, by urging their friends to join them at the few nonsmoking bars. Bar owners will thus perceive the benefits of switching to be lower than they actually are.67

Similarly, humans have a remarkable capacity to adapt to new circumstances and conditions, even highly unpleasant ones. Exposing an individual to new circumstances might initially make her quite unhappy, but over time she might learn to accept or even prefer those circumstances. Psychologists describe the process as hedonic adaptation.68

The power of these psychological mechanisms to produce multiple equilibria should be clear. In a high-smoking equilibrium, nonsmoking customers and employees could adapt to the presence of smoke. This would dull or eliminate their desire to seek out nonsmoking alternatives, which would in turn diminish the incentives of business owners to prohibit smoking. And the reverse is possible as well—smokers in a low-smoking equilibrium might adapt to being unable to smoke.69

Adaptation could then serve to entrench whatever status quo is generated by a temporary ban as well. If a jurisdiction enacts a temporary smoking ban, nonsmokers will have the opportunity to experience nonsmoking bars and might realize how much nicer it is to spend time in a nonsmoking establishment. Their adaptation to smokiness might dissipate. The costs of accompanying their smoking friends to a smoking bar would seem

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67 See Mike Monson, Bar Owners Urge Ban Exemption; Beverage Official Says Rule Would Be ‘Devastating,’ The News Gazette A1 (June 5, 2006) (quoting bar owner as saying “it is a fiction that nonsmokers will replace the smokers who stop patronizing bars.”).
68 For an excellent summary of the initial research on hedonic adaptation, see Shane Frederick and George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds, Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 302, 311–20 (Russell Sage 1999).
69 We hasten to add that, if an equilibrium becomes entrenched because of hedonic adaptation, this does not necessarily mean that the equilibrium is suboptimal. Adaptation may represent a real welfare gain. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 98 Georgetown L J 1583, 1605–10 (2010). Accordingly, a low-smoking equilibrium to which smokers have adapted may be no worse off for the smokers than a high-smoking equilibrium.
higher. Importantly, people often do not remember how quickly they were able to adapt in the past. Thus, the nonsmokers might not realize that they will again adapt to a smoke-filled environment. Once the temporary ban lapses, these nonsmokers might continue to prefer bars that remain nonsmoking, creating additional business for those bars and incentives for them to continue to prohibit smoking. This could lead to a new low-smoking equilibrium.

The final mechanism is the simplest: the ban reduces the number of smokers. Over the long term, smoking rates in the United States are declining. Smoking bans may accelerate that trend because the inconvenience of not being able to smoke in a bar (or other establishment) may cause individuals to quit smoking (or to quit more quickly). Indeed, some smokers apparently support bans for this very reason, as a self-commitment device for quitting (which makes sense if smokers are subject to present bias and otherwise procrastinate about quitting). So if the ban lowers the number of smokers, it may change the profit margins for being a nonsmoking establishment in a way that supports an equilibrium with more such establishments after the ban lapses.

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In sum, there are a great many reasons to expect multiple equilibria in the proportion of establishments permitting smoking. If there are multiple equilibria, the structural argument against smoking bans no longer exists, and there are plausible reasons to prefer a low-smoking over a high-smoking equilibrium. Yet this rationale supports only a temporary law, which, given uncertainty, has certain informational advantages over a permanent law. We now turn to a generalization of this analysis.

II. THE ADVANTAGES (AND DISADVANTAGES) OF TEMPORARY LAW

Now we generalize the smoking-policy example. Temporary law is a useful mechanism for discovering and unsettling suboptimal

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equilibria. Temporary law provides a number of advantages over the alternative of permanent law, which we now address: (1) possible efficiency gains based on superior information, (2) greater accommodation of the demands for liberty, and (3) a new space for political compromise of competing claims. We also consider the potential costs associated with temporary law.

A. Advantages

1. Efficiency (and information).

The main advantage of temporary law is the discovery of a more efficient equilibrium, if there is one. After the law expires, if the behavioral equilibrium remains the same or is otherwise substantially different from the original equilibrium, we have confirmed the existence of multiple equilibria. This is the process we have termed “equilibrium verification and location.” Better information allows efficiency gains when the new equilibrium is welfare enhancing. Alternatively, after the law expires, if the behavior reverts to the original equilibrium, the legislative experiment reveals the case against path dependence and any normative claim predicated on path dependence.

a) Information. At the most basic level, any type of law can be information revealing. Before the law is enacted, there is uncertainty as to what the effects of such a law would be. After the law has been passed, policy makers can observe the new state of the world and determine the law’s effects. In theory, after legalizing prostitution or the sale of heroin, one can observe whether it causes the social ills associated with those activities.

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72 See Listokin, 118 Yale L J at 483 n 1 (cited in note 15) (describing the information-revealing process of policy making as “learning”).
73 Id (“Before implementing a policy, policymakers may have only a dim idea about the effects of the policy.”).
74 Id (“After implementing the policy and observing its effects, policymakers will often have a much better sense of the outcomes associated with the policy in current and future periods.”).
to rise or fall. One can observe whether a minimum wage increases unemployment, as some theory predicts.

What is unique about temporary law, however, is the information revealed not (or not only) by the law’s enactment—its consequences when the law is in effect—but after the law lapses. Policy makers and scholars generally assume that there is only one possible equilibrium for each legal rule (with a given level of enforcement). When this is the case, the expiration of a temporary law tends to return behavior to the status quo ante, so that the expiration itself reveals no useful information. Of course, Listokin directs our attention to the fact that some of the law’s effects are irreversible, as the legalization of heroin might create a new glut of addicts who do not immediately disappear when the prohibition on heroin is reinstated. But even here, the purpose of repeal is to stop the ill effects caused by the new law, which means to respond to information produced by the enactment of the new law, not its expiration.

Yet things are different when there are multiple equilibria. If this is the case, temporary law can allow the policy maker to observe the different equilibria that can exist under a single legal regime. If the legal rule allows smoking in bars, there may be one equilibrium in which 100 percent of bars allow smoking.

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and another equilibrium in which only 50 percent of bars allow smoking. If the choice of equilibrium is path dependent, the equilibrium that develops in response to a particular rule might depend not only upon that legal rule, but in addition on the rule that preceded it. The unique information temporary law reveals is the behavior that results from the same regulation with different initial states.

Temporary law could effectively reveal situations of multiple equilibria caused by any of the mechanisms we described in Part I. Consider first the rational-choice mechanisms. If an equilibrium exists purely because of switching costs, temporary law will reveal a different equilibrium by forcing individuals to bear those switching costs (though as we noted, if the costs of switching exceed the benefits, it is inefficient to switch). This is similarly true if the equilibrium exists because of network effects. If, for instance, it is unprofitable for a single bar to switch from smoking to nonsmoking while other bars continue to allow smoking, it may nonetheless be profitable for the bar to remain nonsmoking if all the other bars around it are similarly made nonsmoking by law. Likewise for coordination or signaling effects: if the existing equilibrium is entrenched because of coordination problems or a type of signal, a temporary law that solves the coordination problem or reverses the signal would reveal an alternative stable equilibrium. In Part IV, we will discuss the types of temporary laws that might achieve this effect in the contexts of crime or seat belt use, our examples from above.

The same conclusion also applies to all of the behavioral mechanisms we described. If an equilibrium holds because existing customers are more available and salient than potential future customers, temporarily changing the legal rule will bring these potential (now actual) customers to the fore. They will become at least as salient, if not more salient, than the customers who existed under the old legal regime. If the equilibrium is being driven by loss aversion or risk aversion, temporary law will simply force individuals and firms to accept the possibility of loss or risk. They will then learn whether their aversion was justified. Temporary law will overcome the sunk cost fallacy in similar fashion, forcing individuals to make changes that the sunk

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80 See Part I.C.2.
Temporary Law

Temporary law also alters the status quo, disrupting biases that depend on that status quo. If an equilibrium has become entrenched because of the endowment effect, temporary law will adjust the entitlement to which individuals (both consumers and producers) have become accustomed. Finally, if a particular equilibrium is due to adaptation or affective-forecasting errors, temporary law will disrupt these mechanisms as well. Individuals who have adapted to one state of the world will find that status quo disrupted and be forced to adapt (or not) to another. And individuals who feared moving from the status quo because they incorrectly forecast that they will be less well-off under a different set of rules will be forced to experience that new set of rules. They will then learn whether their forecast was correct and can adjust their beliefs if they were mistaken.

We hasten to add that temporary law will not allow us to distinguish between these network and behavioral mechanisms. If a temporary smoking ban causes the vast majority of bars in a jurisdiction to continue to prohibit smoking even after the ban is lifted, we cannot know which of the equilibrium-entrenching mechanisms we described was at work. It is possible that many of them were operating in combination. This information would certainly be valuable were it available, but it is not essential before we can draw policy conclusions. If temporary law creates a new (post-repeal) equilibrium that differs greatly from the status quo ante, that indicates that the prior equilibrium was due to forces other than pure market supply and demand. The case against regulation is thus weakened.81

In addition, a single temporary law can identify at most one additional equilibrium.82 Imagine that before a smoking ban is passed, 95 percent of all bars allow smoking (an HSE). A jurisdiction enacts a ban, which automatically lapses after two years. Following the expiration of the temporary ban, the number of bars permitting smoking rises from 0 percent to 20 percent (an LSE). This does not foreclose the possibility that there is another equilibrium located between the HSE and the LSE—for instance, a medium-smoking equilibrium (MSE) at 40 percent. For that matter, there could be dozens (or, theoretically, an infinite

81 See, for example, Sunstein and Thaler, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1161 (cited in note 1) (“[T]he design features of both legal and organizational rules have surprisingly powerful influences on people’s choices.”).

82 We thank Haggai Porat for suggesting this point.
number) of intermediate-smoking equilibria. One of these MSE might be superior to both the LSE and the HSE.

If so, in order to discover the MSE, the jurisdiction must pass yet another temporary law, one that creates a starting point somewhere between the LSE and the HSE. For instance, it might pass a law providing only enough licenses for 50 percent of the bars in the jurisdiction to allow smoking. If that law lapses and the HSE reemerges, with 95 percent of bars allowing smoking, then policy makers have learned that there is no equilibrium between 50 percent smoking and 95 percent smoking.\(^{83}\)

The jurisdiction could then conceivably pass yet another temporary law licensing 35 percent of bars in the jurisdiction to permit smoking in an attempt to discover whether there is an equilibrium between 20 percent and 50 percent.\(^{84}\) Of course, the returns to this exercise diminish quickly as the range of potential alternative equilibria shrinks. Policy makers will have to consider carefully whether the search for additional equilibria justifies the transition costs involved. (We will say more on this point below.)

It is also important to distinguish the informational benefits of temporary law from those of federalism. Federalism is often described as information producing because it allows a policy

\(^{83}\) This conclusion is based upon the supposition that if an equilibrium existed between 50 percent and 95 percent, the population of bars would presumably have come to rest at that equilibrium on its way upwards from 50 percent. Of course, one could imagine that bar owners might play a type of mixed strategy, choosing randomly whether to begin allowing smoking after the ban is lifted, and that they would all play it simultaneously rather than sequentially. If this is the case, then it is conceivable that the number of bars allowing smoking could shoot past some intermediate equilibrium, all the way to 95 percent (or even 100 percent). This is analogous to the idea in statistical physics that all of the air molecules in a room could randomly and spontaneously end up in one corner, suffocating all of the room’s occupants. However, like this physics thought experiment, we believe that the likelihood of such behavior is vanishingly small. To offer just one reason: bar owners (and individuals more generally) do not all act perfectly simultaneously. They have the opportunity to observe one another’s actions before choosing to act. A belief in simultaneous behavior is the type of game-theoretic assumption that generates interesting results but is ultimately unrealistic. Regardless, we thank Tony Casey and Barry Adler for suggesting this important point.

\(^{84}\) A reader might legitimately wonder what it would mean to “license” 35 percent of bars to permit smoking in a jurisdiction in which only 20 percent of bars currently want to permit smoking. In effect, such a law would license only 65 percent of bars to ban smoking; other bars would be forced, as a condition of operation, to allow smoking. Just as a jurisdiction could permit bars to operate only on the condition that they ban smoking, it could permit bars to operate only on the condition that they allow smoking. Accordingly, jurisdictions could move back and forth from low-smoking temporary laws (such as a ban) to high-smoking temporary laws. This point is generalizable across all types of temporary bans.
maker to test one or more policies in smaller jurisdictions. State or local “laboratories” allow experiments at lower risks than does national legislation. Temporary law also constrains risk, but by parceling the new regulation across a subunit of time rather than a subunit of space. Yet these two modes of diversifying regulatory risks are not substitutes. Federalism is not a solution to problems of multiple equilibria. Local experiments with permanent smoking bans do not reveal whether there was a low-smoking equilibrium consistent with the rule permitting smoking. But federalism and temporary law may be complementary. If a temporary law produces a new equilibrium, it will always be possible that some exogenous factor—for instance, the revelation of new information about the dangers of smoking—was responsible, and the temporary law had little to do with it.

One way of disambiguating these possible effects is to experiment (via federalism) with temporary law in some jurisdictions but not others. The proof of multiple equilibria in one jurisdiction may make it more plausible (but not certain) that multiple equilibria exist in another jurisdiction and that temporary law can be used to arrive at a different equilibrium. By contrast, if the expiration of temporary law in one jurisdiction results in restoration of the original equilibrium, the proof of a single equilibrium in one jurisdiction may make less plausible (but not rule out with certainty) the presence of multiple equilibria in another jurisdiction, decreasing the case for even temporary regulation.

b) Efficiency. Given more information, the efficiency advantage of a temporary law is error correction. The rationale for the ban—multiple equilibria—may be based on an error. If the law is effectively enforced, a powerful type of evidence is the reemergence of the original equilibrium after the law expires.

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85 See Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional Rights, 152 U Pa L Rev 1745, 1745–52 (2004): The most appealing reason for courts . . . to preserve the role of autonomous states is the prediction that states will . . . experiment with new policies . . . and produce[e] evidence about the effectiveness and workability of new programs, to be followed . . . by the rest of the states, who can look upon one state’s experiment and learn.

86 New State Ice Co v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). See also Listokin, 118 Yale L J at 514 (cited in note 15) (describing how jurisdictions can observe others’ policy outcomes while avoiding the negative effects of failure).
Temporary law thus allows error correction of poor regulations, providing efficiency advantages. If expiration of the law does not cause behavior to revert to the old equilibrium, the move to the newly discovered equilibrium may be an efficiency gain. As noted above, whether it is a gain depends on some independent analysis, but the existence of the new equilibrium undermines the structural argument for the efficiency of the original equilibrium.87 How might we determine which equilibrium, low smoking or high smoking, is superior? Some alternative mechanism, such as a version of cost-benefit analysis, will be necessary.88 It is beyond the scope of this Article to lay out an approach in full detail, but we will offer some prudential guidance. First, we could measure the net revenues of bars and restaurants at the old and new equilibria. If net revenues have increased after the switch to the new equilibrium, this is evidence that both bar owners and customers prefer the new equilibrium.89 Another means of getting at the same question would be to measure the number of person-hours spent in bars at the new and old equilibria. If bar customers were, collectively, spending more time in bars at the new equilibrium, or if more people were patronizing bars at that equilibrium, that too would be evidence that the switch to the new equilibrium has increased welfare by providing greater opportunities for bar patrons.

These may be difficult quantities to measure, but there is also a potential shortcut. The goal in searching out a new equilibrium is to provide a greater range of options to customers—that is, to better align supply with demand. If customers have more options, it is more likely that they will find a bar that meets their preferences and will patronize it. Generally speaking, the more extreme the equilibrium, the fewer the options available to customers. If 98 percent of all bars permit smoking, very few customers will have a nonsmoking bar available to them. If, on the other hand, “only” 55 percent of bars allow

87 See notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
89 See Jérôme Adda, Samuel Berlinski, and Stephen Machin, Market Regulation and Firm Performance: The Case of Smoking Bans in the United Kingdom, 55 J L & Econ 365, 374 (2012) (finding that bar revenues in Scotland decreased after a smoking ban was implemented). Of course, this provides little information about the relative merits of a high-smoking equilibrium versus a low-smoking equilibrium (if one exists), but it demonstrates the availability of a methodology for comparison.
smoking, many more potential patrons will have both a smoking and a nonsmoking bar in their vicinity. The additional options will likely increase bar patronage. Accordingly, we can tentatively conclude that an equilibrium in which the proportion of smoking bars more closely matches the proportion of smokers in the general population will likely be superior to one in which those proportions differ more greatly. Or, more generally, the more proportionately available the various options, the better.

This conclusion is only tentative because it might be that an activity such as smoking is highly correlated with bar patronage. If this is the case, then an equilibrium closer to the proportion of smokers in the general population might leave the smoking bars overly crowded with patrons, and some smokers will not have bars they can patronize because of capacity constraints. This is an empirical question, and one that depends upon whether bars have excess unused capacity. But the idea that a more proportional equilibrium is likely to be superior is a useful rule of thumb, even if it is only a rule of thumb.

Thus, temporary law is efficient when it appears that the status quo is trapped in a suboptimal equilibrium (a superior equilibrium exists), there are informational barriers to directly mandating the better equilibrium (including uncertainty about whether it actually exists), and the costs of switching between equilibria are low compared to the efficiency gains.\footnote{More precisely, we have to consider both the costs of the initial switch to the new equilibrium the temporary law imposes and the probability of incurring the additional switching costs, and their magnitude, if the original equilibrium reemerges after the law expires.} Suppose that a superior equilibrium exists with probability $p$. Let $B$ be the efficiency gain from this superior equilibrium compared with the status quo. Let $SC_1$ be the cost to individuals of switching from the status quo to complying with a temporary law (for example, a complete smoking ban). Let $SC_0$ be the cost to individuals of switching from the temporary legal regime back to the status quo, and $SC_2$ the cost of switching from the temporary legal regime to a new equilibrium (if one exists). Temporary law is justified if (and only if):

$$pB > SC_1 + pSC_2 + (1 - p)SC_0$$

It is worth noting that a number of these terms are related. As $B$ increases, $SC_2$ will decrease. The reason is that the more that the new equilibrium diverges from the old equilibrium, and
the more that it resembles the temporary legal regime, the greater the efficiency benefits of switching to it and the smaller the number of individuals who will have to switch from the temporary legal regime. Similarly, as $SC_1$ increases, $B$ increases as well. That is, if the temporary regime is very far from the current equilibrium, switching costs will be higher but the potential benefits from locating a new equilibrium could be higher as well.

Of course, we hasten to add that if we do not know where the second equilibrium is located, or even whether that second equilibrium exists, we cannot know $B$ (the efficiency gain of reaching that equilibrium) to any degree of certainty. This is one important sense in which the advantages of temporary law arise only in the absence of first-best information. The value of generating equilibrium verification and location can be obtained only at the risk of $B$ being small and the game not worth the candle. Accordingly, policy makers should undertake experiments with temporary law only when they have some intuitive or empirical reason to believe that $p$ and $B$ are relatively large and $SC_{0-2}$ relatively small.

This point applies even more strongly to the discovery of third or fourth equilibria. Suppose that within a given jurisdiction, 95 percent of bars currently permit smoking. Suppose further that policy makers have reason to believe that a low-smoking equilibrium exists and that such an equilibrium would be welfare superior to the current equilibrium. Policy makers might reasonably believe that a temporary ban on smoking could produce welfare gains that outweigh the transition costs involved, particularly if the LSE is very far from the HSE. The greater the change in individuals' behavior, the greater the likelihood that the benefits from those changes will outweigh the fixed costs of switching between smoking and nonsmoking regimes.

Now suppose that a temporary ban reveals an LSE in which 75 percent of bars permit smoking. It is of course possible that there is yet another equilibrium between 75 percent and 95 percent and that this MSE is, for some reason, superior to the LSE. The existence of an MSE is less likely precisely because the HSE and LSE are so close to one another. But assuming its existence and superiority, enacting another temporary law (for instance, one that licenses 85 percent of bars to permit smoking) will again create transition costs. These costs will likely be small, because relatively few bars will be forced to switch. But potential
gains are small as well, because few people (and bars) will be changing their behavior. There are fixed costs to enacting a ban of any type, including legislative costs and the costs of informing the public. The smaller the potential change in behavior, the greater the likelihood that these fixed costs will exceed any potential benefits.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the initial temporary ban reveals an LSE with only 10 percent of bars allowing smoking. If an MSE exists between 10 percent and 95 percent, which seems more plausible, a jurisdiction would have greater reason to attempt to locate it, assuming there is reason to believe the MSE would increase social welfare over the LSE. Because an MSE might be quite far from either the LSE or HSE, the benefits of moving to such an equilibrium could conceivably exceed the costs of getting there.

This analysis also has implications for legal and regulatory experimentalism. As we described earlier, a number of scholars have advocated the use of temporary law to experiment with varied policies. The theory behind these proposals is that if the new legal regime is inferior to the prior one, policy makers can simply repeal the law (or allow it to lapse naturally) and return to the superior status quo ante. However, our theory indicates that this may not be so easy. If a given legal regime can generate multiple equilibria under different path-dependent conditions, the post-repeal world may look different from the pre-regulation world. The new equilibrium might be superior to the old one, in which case the regulatory experiment turns out to be beneficial. But it also might be inferior, in which case policy makers might be required to pass yet another temporary law—with accompanying transition costs—in order to return to the true status quo ante. The point is that policy makers and scholars who hope to experiment with law must consider the possibility of multiple equilibria when weighing the costs and benefits of legal interventions.

2. Liberty.

Liberal theory assumes as a default position that government should not regulate in the absence of market failure. See note 15. We
have hypothesized that there may be situations in which market failure generates a socially suboptimal equilibrium when other, more efficient equilibria are possible. As we have explained, one way to move to a more efficient equilibrium is to simply impose a permanent regulation. But if we are correct that the choice of market equilibrium is path dependent, then permanent regulation might not be necessary. Policy makers could accomplish the same (or better) ends by using a temporary law that simply alters the legal path.

If temporality were to become a standard regulatory option, then those who advocated a permanent ban would have to offer a rationale for restricting liberty permanently (something other than path dependence). Temporary law also works against the general ratcheting effect of increasing government regulation permeating ever more aspects of human life.93 Because the law will expire on its own, it does not require coordinated action on the part of the political branches to return to the unregulated status quo. Those who favor liberty, as either an instrumental or an intrinsic good, should thus prefer temporary law to permanent law. Repealing the regulation allows the idiosyncratic to revert to their preferred behavior. Some or even most smokers may adjust to no-smoking bars, but those who do not can still find a bar to indulge their preferences.94

Nonetheless, we can certainly understand that libertarians might perceive the idea of temporary law as a threat to liberty precisely because it appears to lower the stakes. First, there might be some cases in which the politics of the situation would not support a permanent regulation but will support a temporary regulation (as discussed in the next Section). Second, there is some possibility that the supporters of the regulation will keep gathering support to extend it, transforming a temporary regulation into a de facto permanent one.95

problem of market failure provides the basic public-interest justification for the displacement of private ordering by government intervention.


94 See Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller, Freedom of Contracts *72–73 (unpublished manuscript, 2013) (on file with authors) (describing the value of facilitating individual idiosyncratic choice when informed decision making may be difficult).

We don’t entirely reject these concerns, but we note a few responses. First, the logic we are proposing does not support the continuous renewal of temporary regulations. The de facto permanency of regulations undermines the credibility of the claim that the problem being addressed is path dependence. Second, the implication of our theory is not only the desirability of certain temporary regulations in the future, but also the fact that some past regulations that were permanent should have been temporary. Thus, the argument for temporary regulations supports the repeal of some existing regulations. Most obviously, if one justifies smoking bans based on path dependence, our argument implies the desirability of eventually repealing the bans. In the final Part, we discuss seat belt laws as another possible example.

3. Politics.

The final advantage is political: temporary regulation creates new policy space for political bargains. Because the opponents of regulation will understand that the status quo ante will return after the regulatory period ends, they may be less resistant to explicitly temporary rules. Also, the optimism bias works in favor of this compromise.96 Those favoring the regulation can optimistically believe in their path-dependence arguments, therefore predicting that they will maintain a new equilibrium after the law is repealed. Those opposed to the regulation can optimistically believe that the status quo ante is the only possible equilibrium absent regulation, so it will return once the temporary law expires. With more space for political bargains, the stakes are lower, so there will be fewer resources wastefully invested in the political competition.97

We note that temporary clauses are common in national and subnational constitutions, where they are particularly useful as solutions to bargaining problems. Many constitutional negotiations have the character of bilateral monopoly, in which two parties have no alternative negotiating partners but also have an


incentive to hold out for a better deal. Temporary provisions can facilitate needed institutional reforms or allow further information to be revealed so that a bargain can be concluded at a later date. Oftentimes the “temporary” legislation is actually a rule preventing legislators from overturning a default clause for a limited period of time. This is not precisely temporary legislation as we have defined it. But the effect can similarly be one of revealing information and allowing experiments.

B. Costs

Temporary law also has some important disadvantages relative to permanent law. These include duplicative switching costs, incurred when a jurisdiction returns to the status quo ante, and lower-quality law.

1. Duplicative switching costs.

We anticipate the use of temporary law in situations in which we are not confident that the status quo ante represents the only or best equilibrium. In some instances, however, the decision to use temporary law may be wrong. In such an instance, people may have to switch back to the earlier equilibrium at some cost.

Consider the smoking-ban example. When the ban on smoking took effect, bars might have hired waitstaff who preferred to work in a smoke-free environment. When the temporary smoking ban lapses, those employees are more likely to leave for other jobs, forcing the bar owners to find and hire new employees. Of course, the very fact that the ban is temporary may lead some bar owners to hedge their bets and refrain from hiring employees who are more likely to quit in the future. Similarly, some smoke-averse employees might avoid taking jobs in bars. But we acknowledge that there will likely be some fixed costs from switching that have to be borne twice. Similarly, bars would not likely have had smoking-related signage when all bars always allowed smoking. During the period of regulation, bar owners may have to purchase signage that says “No smoking allowed”; if they choose to allow smoking thereafter, they will need new signs that indicate that smoking is allowed. These are unrecoverable switching costs that result from the temporary law.
2. Lower-quality law.

When a law is meant to be temporary, legislators might not invest in writing the highest-quality law.\(^98\) It might be overbroad or underinclusive in some respect, or it might target the wrong conduct.\(^99\) For this reason, temporary law might work best when the temporary rule is relatively simple, like a smoking ban, and not as well when the rule requires complex legislative drafting.

Similarly, the law might not be enforced as rigorously as a permanent law because the officers charged with its enforcement know that it is only temporary. If under-enforcement dampens the law’s impact significantly, then the informational value of the temporary law could be eliminated. Or private parties might not make as great an effort to comply with the law if they know it to be temporary. For instance, bar owners might not bother purchasing new, smoke-free furniture or might install low-quality signage. If no private parties are forced to change their conduct because the temporary law is either unenforced or easily evaded, then the status quo remains uninterrupted.

It is important, then, that the law be designed and enforced such that there is at least reasonable compliance. Indeed, depending on the context, one might imagine creating a compliance trigger for the law’s expiration rather than a simple calendar date. For example, one might say that the law will expire after eighteen months of a measurably high level of compliance. This would work if compliance were reasonably easy to measure, but not otherwise. For example, indoor-smoking compliance can be checked by devices that measure the chemical traces of tobacco smoke in the ambient air.

Yet temporary law will not be a good mechanism for discovering multiple equilibria if there is a significant chance of non-compliance and no easy way to agree on what the compliance level is. Relatedly, a poorly designed temporary law might fail to locate alternative equilibria, frustrating the objective of the enterprise and creating duplicative switching costs without any gains. The behavioral mechanisms that entrench the status quo

\(^{98}\) Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 BC L Rev 1327, 1371 (2008) (“[L]egislatures will take their job less seriously because they know that the legislation is only temporary.”).

and can thus create multiple equilibria do not reverse themselves instantaneously. For instance, if a bar has allowed smoking for twenty years and then is forced by a temporary law to ban smoking, the new nonsmoking customers who show up on the first nonsmoking day do not immediately become “available.” They are not yet the bar’s regulars, and will not be for some time. Similarly, bar patrons and employees will not all feel as though they “own” an entitlement to be free of smoke, for purposes of the endowment effect, on the first day that such a law springs into existence. Adaptation to new conditions also takes time, in some cases approximately two years.100

Accordingly, if a temporary law expires after too short a period, it may not succeed in counteracting the behavioral tendencies that had entrenched the previous status quo. Even if an alternative equilibrium exists, the law may not succeed in discovering it. Private actors will have undergone switching costs for no reason.

On the other hand, a temporary law with an unnecessarily long duration can impose needless costs as well. The longer the temporary law, the longer that private parties are stuck in an inefficient governmentally mandated situation (for instance, a complete smoking ban). If a temporary law lasting two years would be sufficient to locate a new low-smoking equilibrium, and a city council passes a ten-year ban, those additional eight years were unnecessary and costly. This is true whether or not a low-smoking equilibrium exists. Regardless of whether a new equilibrium exists or whether private parties will return to the old equilibrium, the extra time spent under a complete prohibition generates social costs.

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Temporary law provides a number of advantages over permanent law. For our purposes, the most important of these advantages is the ability to expose path-dependent equilibria and reveal situations in which multiple alternative equilibria might exist. It is for this reason that we believe temporary law offers the most direct and appropriate response to the multiple-equilibria problems we described above.

100 See Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, 108 Colum L Rev at 1526 (cited in note 97).
III. A TEMPORARY SMOKING BAN: THE CASE OF CHAMPAIGN

We know of no smoking ban that was explicitly designed as temporary. However, we have studied one jurisdiction that unintentionally adopted a temporary ban, in that it enacted and later repealed a ban on smoking in bars. This Part describes the ban in some detail.

Champaign (population 82,517) and Urbana (population 41,581) are twin cities that are host to the University of Illinois, the flagship public university of the state. The two cities are the largest in mostly rural Champaign County, and many local residents believe that they have different characters, with Urbana being more liberal and willing to regulate business. The cities have different municipal governments, but share certain governmental functions through special districts, such as a Mass Transit District and a Public Health District.

Like many municipalities around the country, Champaign and its neighboring city of Urbana were subject to pressure from antismoking groups, as well as resistance from bar owners and libertarians who sought to retain smoking. In the late spring of 2006, Champaign and Urbana both passed smoking bans, effective January 2007. While Urbana began taking steps to implement the ban, political controversy continued in Champaign.


102 See Wikitravel, Champaign-Urbana, online at http://wikitravel.org/en/Champaign-Urbana (visited Mar 2, 2014) (“Urbana is seen as the more politically liberal and pastoral of the two, and Champaign is seen as having more of a big-city feel.”).


104 The ban proponents were known as the CU Smokefree Alliance; the opponents were C-U Puff (People United For Freedom), formed to counter the smoking ban and debunk claims of a link between secondhand smoke and cancer rates. See Mike Monson, Group Turns Its Attention to Urbana; Members Ask City Council to Start Considering a Smoking Ban, The News Gazette A1 (Nov 8, 2005).

In reaction to the Champaign ban, candidates running for at-large seats in the city council cited the smoking ban—either their support or their opposition—as a motivation for entering politics. One argued that the ban was part of an attack on property rights. The ban also led to a challenge to two-term mayor Jerry Schweighart of Champaign, who had run unopposed in the previous election. The challenger cited the smoking ban as a reason for his candidacy.

In city council elections held in 2006, ban opponents supported a slate of candidates that promised to repeal the ban, and these candidates won handily. Ban proponents expressed disappointment but hoped that a statewide ban under discussion would preempt the issue. On May 1, 2007, the Illinois House of Representatives passed a smoking ban that would take effect January 1, 2008, but it required the signature of the governor. The proposed state ban was stricter than the local ordinances as it banned smoking in all workplaces.

The same day, Champaign Mayor Schweighart announced that he would nevertheless seek an immediate repeal of the smoking ban for bars. At the next city council meeting on May 15, the repeal passed, effective immediately. It affected only bars, so restaurants remained smoke-free. Champaign thus became the first jurisdiction in the United States to repeal a smoking ban and provides an example of a temporary smoking ban. Figure 3 below lays out the sequence of events.

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106 See Mike Monson, 15 Will Vie for At-Large Seat; Interviews to Take Place Tuesday; Appointment May Be Made Aug. 15, The News Gazette A1 (Aug 2, 2006).
107 See Mike Monson, Primary to Be Held for At-Large Candidates, The News Gazette A5 (Dec 16, 2006).
109 Mike Monson, Champaign Mayor to Seek Repeal at May 15 Meeting, The News Gazette A1 (May 2, 2007).
110 Smoke Free Illinois Act, Public Act 95-00017 (2007), codified at 410 ILCS § 82/1 et seq.
112 See Monson, Champaign Mayor to Seek Repeal at A1 (cited in note 109).
114 For additional examples of smoking bans repealed shortly after enactment, see Geneva’s Smoking Ban Returns after One-Year Break, Agence France-Presse (Sept 27, 2009) (describing the smoking ban in Geneva, Switzerland, that was brought back by
### FIGURE 3. TIMELINE OF CHAMPAIGN-URBANA SMOKING BAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Champaign</th>
<th>Urbana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td><em>Adopts smoking ban</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Adopts smoking ban</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2007</td>
<td>Ban takes effect Jan 31</td>
<td>Ban takes effect Jan 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Senate introduces Smoke Free Illinois Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td>State Senate adopts Smoke Free Illinois Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>State House adopts Smoke Free Illinois Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repeals smoking ban</td>
<td>Ban remains in effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>Governor Blagojevich signs statewide ban</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2008</td>
<td>State ban takes effect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Governor Rod Blagojevich signed the statewide ban in July. Note that because of the subsequent statewide ban, the Champaign *repeal* was also temporary in character, lasting only 7.5 months. While it was uncertain at the time of the repeal whether the governor would in fact sign the state ban, bar owners who had undergone switching costs to comply with the ban (discarding ashtrays, disabling ventilation systems, etc.) would have had to consider the likelihood of a state ban coming into effect when evaluating whether to absorb the costs of switching back to smoking. In the aftermath of the repeal, thirty of fifty bars that we observed returned to smoking.

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115 See *Bill Status of SB0509* (cited in note 111).
117 Data on file with authors. Several bars were closed for the summer, making it impossible to determine their policy.

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While some of the bar owners that did not return to allowing smoking noted that they had learned about the benefits of nonsmoking from the ban, they also cited the imminent statewide ban as a reason not to switch. Accordingly, the subsequent statewide ban presents a potential confounding factor. Nonetheless, we present our findings regarding smoking and compliance levels because we believe they shed at least some light on the effects of temporary law in the presence of multiple equilibria.

We sent observers to monitor the level of smoking and rates of patronage before and after the smoking ban took effect. For each bar, we had researchers pay at least three visits at different times of day during the week before and after the ban took effect (January 1, 2007, in Urbana; January 31, 2007, in Champaign). Our observers were instructed to note the total number of patrons in the bar over the course of an hour, and the number who smoked during any point in their visit. Bar staff were excluded from the analysis.

Our initial research concern was to evaluate compliance with the ban. We found overwhelming compliance with the law, despite a very weak enforcement structure. Out of fifteen bars in Urbana, all but one immediately exhibited perfect compliance, and that bar was the subject of a complaint. In Champaign, we observed perfect compliance in sixty-three establishments. The high levels of compliance suggest that the law was working, even without formal enforcement efforts. This high level of compliance may be an example of what one of us has called the expressive role of law. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Or L Rev 339, 371–72 (2000). See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Powers of Law: Theories and Limits (forthcoming Harvard 2014).

118 See Mike Monson, Several Bars 'Not Going Back': Two Champaign Owners Say Business Is Good; Others Would Let Customers Light Up until State Takes Action, The News Gazette A1 (May 14, 2007) (interviewing bar owner and musician Jon “Cody” Sokolski, who noted that the ban made him feel better when performing on stage, and also discussed the sunk costs of switching, as well as potential for confusing customers by reverting before the ban).

119 The official enforcement policy requires repeated warnings, and both police and the public health district had expressed reluctance to imposing even the minimal punitive fines available under the ordinances. Fines ranged from $165 to $750. Urbana, Illinois Code of Ordinances 1-18 ($165) and 1-10 ($750), online at http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientID=11645&stateID=13&statename=Illinois (visited Mar 2, 2014). See also Interview 4a (Apr 16, 2007) (Champaign Police Department, on file with authors).

an average of 24.4 in the first month after the ban \((n = 13)\). Though the sample sizes are too small to demonstrate statistical significance, this suggests at a minimum that the pre-ban equilibrium may not have been uniquely optimal. Furthermore, newspapers reported that revenue was up for Champaign restaurants and bars after the ban.\(^{121}\)

After the repeal took effect in Champaign on May 15, 2007, we were able to study the responses of the thirty bars that reinstated smoking. There were fifteen bars for which we had at least three observations of patronage and smoking behavior both before the ban and after the repeal. (We also observed patronage and smoking rates in the interim stage, when the ban was in effect.) We observed that post-repeal, the bars that returned to smoking had higher levels of patronage \((\text{mean} = 44.7)\) than they did before the ban went into effect \((\text{mean} = 29.8)\). They also observed higher percentages of smoking patrons \((37.9\% \text{ post-repeal vs. } 31\% \text{ pre-ban})\).\(^{122}\) Seventy-five percent of the bars that returned to smoking showed higher patronage post-repeal, while 71 percent showed higher concentrations of smokers.\(^{123}\) These data are consistent with the idea that the initial equilibrium in which all bars allowed smoking was suboptimal relative to a mixed equilibrium in which some bars allowed smoking and others did not. The data also provide some evidence for sorting and market segmentation, since the concentrations of smoking were higher after the ban was repealed than before it was put into effect.

Our interviews revealed a number of different motivations for returning to smoking. Some of the bar owners felt that they lost business during the ban, and our observations were

\(^{121}\) Charles Vance, *Smoking Ban Revenue* (WCIA 3 May 7, 2007), online at http://www.smokersclubinc.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4146 (visited Mar 2, 2014). Some reports noted a decline in restaurant tax revenue for the first two months followed by an increase. See, for example, Mike Monson, *C-U Tax Revenues Spark Debate; Officials Have Different Opinions about Business Impact*, The News Gazette A1 (May 9, 2007); Monson, *Champaign Mayor to Seek Repeal of Smoking Ban* at A1 (cited in note 109) (noting that revenues were down in February but up in March 2007).

\(^{122}\) The \(n\) is too small to demonstrate statistical significance. Furthermore, we cannot rule out that the observed differences in patronage are attributable to the different times of year. The ban was repealed in summer, and it is possible that more people attend bars at that time. On the other hand, the time of year would likely not explain higher levels of smoking. During summer, people may be able to go outside to smoke, which is less pleasant in Champaign in the winter. We would thus expect to observe more smokers *inside* bars in the winter than in the summer.

\(^{123}\) Data on file with authors.
consistent with this. Thirteen of the fifteen bars that we observed at least three times had lower average patronage during the ban then they had beforehand.\textsuperscript{124} Some identified marginally higher costs in the form of having to run outdoor heaters for smokers in winter.\textsuperscript{125} In addition, some bar owners were themselves smokers who felt personally besieged by the ban.\textsuperscript{126} At least one bar owner, interviewed during the temporary ban, asserted that his bar would revert if the ban were repealed because “all bars would”; but the bar failed to revert after the repeal.\textsuperscript{127}

In short, there were three stages of regulatory development. In the first, there was no regulation at all, and 100 percent of bars had smoking. In the second stage, with a ban, 0 percent of bars had smoking. In the third stage, after the temporary regulation was repealed, 60 percent of bars had smoking while 40 percent did not. It is our speculation that this last distribution more closely approximated the actual levels of demand for smoking establishments than did the status quo ante. The temporary law helped to reveal this equilibrium.

Our interview data are consistent with our theoretical account: bar owners who did not switch back reported a variety of motivations. While some of them did mention the possibility of the state ban, others reported that they had themselves learned how pleasant it was not to have pervasive smoke. One interviewee reported that he himself was a nonsmoker but had feigned opposition to the ban to keep customers,\textsuperscript{128} Another, who had opposed the ban on libertarian grounds, disclosed that he had not reverted to allowing smoking because he found that nonsmoking provided a superior environment.\textsuperscript{129} While it is only anecdotal, some interviewees reported that the potential statewide ban was not an issue in their decision not to return to smoking. Lower cleaning costs and the transition costs of reinstalling air purification equipment were also cited as reasons for remaining nonsmoking, even after smoking was again allowed.\textsuperscript{130} These rationales suggest that even without the subsequent

\textsuperscript{124} Patronage declined from an average of 29.8 patrons to an average of 24.8. This is despite the fact that most bars experienced higher patronage.
\textsuperscript{125} Interview R2 (Apr 13, 2007) (on file with authors).
\textsuperscript{126} Id.
\textsuperscript{127} Interview R4 (Apr 13, 2007) (on file with authors).
\textsuperscript{128} Interview T14A (May 30, 2007) (on file with authors).
\textsuperscript{129} Interview T17 (June 2, 2007) (on file with authors).
\textsuperscript{130} Interview R5 (May 29, 2007) (on file with authors).
statewide ban, the temporary smoking ban would have led to a new post-ban equilibrium in which less than 100 percent of bars allowed smoking.

IV. GENERAL APPLICATIONS

We believe that the argument for temporary law generalizes to many forms of paternalistic regulation, as well as other issues likely to present multiple equilibria but significant barriers to determining the optimal one. In this Part we describe several other situations in which we believe that multiple equilibria exist and temporary laws could be profitably employed or are already in use.

A. Seat Belts

Seat belts save lives. However, before they were in widespread use, people felt that they were inconvenient and uncomfortable. This led to very low rates of seat belt usage and the adoption, in the United States, of “technology-forcing regulation” that required automobile manufacturers to include so-called “passive measures” in all cars. This led in turn to the technological development of automatically locking seatbelts (which were wildly unpopular) and airbags. The issue was a major regulatory battleground, with successive political administrations adopting different rules. Today, many states have enacted mandatory seat belt laws, which have been shown to increase seat belt usage. These laws are permanent.

We can imagine a path-dependence argument that supports only limited government intervention in the form of a temporary law. We will not rehearse all the reasons that seat belt use might have multiple equilibria, but here are two. First, as previously discussed, there are signaling effects when drivers have


passengers because, when usage in a society is low, a passenger who wears a seat belt may insult the driver by suggesting that he or she is incompetent.\textsuperscript{135} Even the driver might incur social costs by wearing a seat belt when no one else does because, against the social practice, the driver seems unattractively timid, fearful, or incompetent. By contrast, when seat belt usage is high, wearing a belt does not convey distrust of the driver or great timidity. Thus, there are multiple equilibria.

Second, there are ways in which behavioral biases exacer-
bate the standard switching costs. At first, wearing a seat belt is uncomfortable and requires conscious effort, but after a time one develops a habit of buckling up and doesn’t notice much discomfort.\textsuperscript{136} Individuals must decide whether to invest in developing the habit and might rationally decide not to. Individuals with limited self-control might wish to invest in the habit but nonetheless procrastinate;\textsuperscript{137} those subject to affective forecasting errors will overestimate how long it takes to adjust to the initial discomfort and therefore mistakenly decide not to acquire the habit.\textsuperscript{138} In all of these cases, individuals who started out wearing seat belts would make different decisions than individuals who did not start out wearing seat belts.

For this reason, if one rejects wholehearted paternalism, one could still justify temporary mandates under our theory. But the theory implies that we should phase out such laws in states where they have existed for some time (perhaps with an exception for new drivers, discussed below). Having raised total usage to historically high rates, there is no longer a social cost to wearing a seat belt as a driver or passenger. Having coerced drivers into the experience of wearing a seat belt, most have developed the habit now and would continue on without coercion. Those who would not continue on might have strong (if idiosyncratic) reasons not to wear them. As with smokers, the efficient outcome might be to permit those who continue to prefer the risky behavior to have their way, given that a temporary law is sufficient to cause most people to take the less risky behavior.

\textsuperscript{135} See Lessig, 62 U Chi L Rev at 952 (cited in note 57) (describing the social meaning of putting on a seat belt in a Budapest taxi).

\textsuperscript{136} See Cass R. Sunstein, \textit{Legal Interference with Private Preferences}, 53 U Chi L Rev 1129, 1137 (1986) (“Suppose that the costs of initial use are quite high; when drivers and passengers first buckle the belts, they do so unwillingly. Suppose too that the costs associated with buckling decrease sharply once one has gotten into the habit.”).

\textsuperscript{137} See text accompanying note 62.

\textsuperscript{138} See Part I.C.2.
Such temporary laws or the repeal of existing laws might treat new drivers differently. A temporary condition for a new license might be the requirement that one use a seat belt for a time, say two to four years, after which the driver can obtain a license that does not require the behavior. Drivers might adapt to the new condition and learn that they do not mind the belt that they initially hated. In light of the health and safety benefits, most of them might continue the behavior after it is no longer required. But those who continue to find it extremely unpleasant can stop. In this way, temporary regulation might preserve liberties while changing behavior for the substantial majority of people.

B. Affirmative Action

Proponents of affirmative action characterize the market as producing a suboptimal level of educational or workforce participation by racial minorities, females, or other underrepresented groups. The idea here draws from path dependence. Given past patterns of educational and employment discrimination, the removal of explicit discrimination alone may be insufficient to reveal an “optimal” equilibrium that reflects the actual distribution of talent in society. Indeed, it is possible that there will be continuing market failures based on information asymmetries. For example, employers making hiring decisions may rely on existing levels of workforce participation in considering new hires. The result would be very slow or even no progress toward an optimal hiring equilibrium.

Affirmative action is conceived of as helping to overcome this kind of market failure. It is usually considered to be a “temporary” remedy, a point made quite explicit by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her Grutter v Bollinger opinion. In upholding the University of Michigan’s use of race in undergraduate admissions, O’Connor noted that “race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time” and suggested that the interest of the university in utilizing such policies would not last more than

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140 Id at 342.
a period of twenty-five years. A similar argument may make sense in the context of Title VII.

Indeed, international law conceives of affirmative action as inherently temporary in character. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states that affirmative action programs “shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved.” The temporary and remedial nature of affirmative action distinguishes it from “ordinary” racial discrimination.

The affirmative action story fits the case for a temporary law. It is easy to agree that the status quo ante produced an inefficient equilibrium because of the legacy of public and private discrimination, continuing behavioral biases, and underinvestment in human capital by those discriminated against as a rational response to lack of opportunities. Discrimination entrenches the status quo over time when markets are the only remedial mechanism. At the same time, it is unclear what the precise level of participation is for any particular group in any particular market. An approach that sets quotas for participation is an attempt to move toward a particular specified equilibrium. It may be more efficient than the situation of no regulation, but it is hard to tell, as the informational barriers are large. Affirmative action can be viewed as an attempt to intervene in labor and educational markets so as to better reveal the optimal equilibrium—that which would exist in the absence of either a discriminatory starting point or mandatory quotas.

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141 Id at 342–43.
142 See John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U Pa L Rev 1411, 1423–28 (1986) (showing that the work of Title VII is frontloaded and will drive discriminators from the marketplace).
143 Resolution 2106 (XX), UN General Assembly, 1406th mtg (Dec 21, 1965), UN Doc A/6014 48.
145 A temporary scheme may be superior to the status quo ante of no regulation, but may also generate rent-seeking behavior that makes it difficult to let the law expire. Even so, the need to review the programs after set periods puts some burden on proponents to justify the extensions and surely is superior to a permanent scheme. Malaysia provides an interesting illustration of a temporary affirmative action scheme, but also the political difficulties of modifying it once it has been established. When drafting the Malaysian Constitution, the Reid Commission of the United Kingdom sought to ensure the special position of the indigenous Malays, who formed a narrow majority of the
C. Curfews and Crime

Another example of explicitly temporary law is a curfew. Curfews are restrictions on presence in public spaces, usually adopted to combat crime or to otherwise change the social dynamics of a particular locality. The rationale is that the status quo ante represents a suboptimal equilibrium that can be remedied by a temporary disruption to the pattern of social interaction. For example, if young people have the habit of congregating each evening in a particular location, each individual will have an expectation that others will show up at the same spot. If the people in question are drug dealers or criminals, there may be significant externalities from this equilibrium. A temporary ban can disrupt expectations about where and when to congregate, and thus may change the equilibrium level of crime or drug dealing after the ban is lifted.

In Laurel, Delaware, for example, Mayor John Shwed instituted an emergency curfew for nonresidents of the Carvel resident complex on February 22, 2012. The curfew was imposed in response to an increase in violence and gang activity, and remained in effect from 10:00 p.m. through 6:00 a.m. The effect of the curfew was apparently positive; the town's police chief noted that it was followed by an almost 60 percent decrease in complaints of criminal activities at the housing complex. As a result of reduced violence, the mayor decided not to extend the

population but were economically far behind the ethnic Chinese and Indian subjects of British Malaya. See Kenzō Horii, Disintegration of the Colonial Economic Legacies and Social Restructuring in Malaysia, 29 Developing Econ 281, 285–87 (1991). The Commission recommended setting aside a certain number of public service commissions, business licenses, and university scholarships for Malays, but also suggested that these provisions expire fifteen years after independence. Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957 ¶¶ 163–67 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office), online at http://www.krisispraxis.com/Constitutional%20Commission%201957.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014) (describing the current situation and noting that there was agreement for continuing preferences on a temporary basis). However, the affirmative action scheme was retained after the subset period, and remains largely intact today. See Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia 297–303 (Hawaii 2d ed 2001) (describing ethnic tensions and violence, with the New Economic Policy adopted as a solution). But see Joseph Chin, MRCB, Pos in Focus after PM Unveils New Economic Model (The Edge Malaysia Mar 30, 2010), online at http://www.theedgemalaysia.com/highlights/162642-mrcb-pos-in-focus-after-pm-unveils-new-economic-model.html (visited Mar 2, 2014) (discussing the prime minister’s announcement of review and gradual phase out of quotas).


147 Id.
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curfew, and it was removed on September 4th, 2012.\textsuperscript{148} City officials and residents believed that crime would not go back to the precurfew level\textsuperscript{149} and, though there is no hard data, there has been no news of rising crime.

Curfews like that found in Laurel are not uncommon and have been implemented in East St. Louis, Philadelphia, and other cities.\textsuperscript{150} In a democracy, permanent restrictions on liberty are frowned upon, so curfews may be framed as temporary in nature, or else restricted to minors. For example, the Philadelphia curfew adopted in October 2011, specifically meant to respond to problems with flash mobs, was, at its creation, set to expire on December 15th, 2013.\textsuperscript{151} The Philadelphia Police Department claims that the law has been effective in reducing crime and has incentivized the city to provide youth with alternative activities including bowling nights and spending more time at recreation centers.\textsuperscript{152} In short, the temporary curfew is a tool employed with some regularity in democracies that illustrates the use of temporary law to find superior equilibria. It is obviously superior relative to a permanent restriction on liberty.

As a corollary, consider the crime problem we described in Part I.C.1, in which a neighborhood is crime ridden because there is insufficient foot traffic at night. This is effectively the opposite of the curfew problem. One could imagine a temporary law requiring individuals to frequent a particular neighborhood at night, but that would likely be viewed as too great an intrusion upon personal liberty to be viable. (It would also be difficult to enforce.) Instead, a community might solve the collective action problem by temporarily increasing the police presence in the neighborhood. If there are enough police to guarantee safety,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Tony E. Windsor, Laurel Officials Stop Emergency Curfew at Public Housing Complex (Laurel Star), online at http://www.laurelstar.com/index.cfm?ref=42578&ref2=380 (visited Mar 2, 2014).
\item Gonzalez, City Curfew Law (cited in note 150). See also City of Philadelphia Bill No 110633 (terminating the curfew, codified at Philadelphia Code § 10-303, on December 15th, 2013).
\item Gonzalez, City Curfew Law (cited in note 150).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
any individual could frequent the neighborhood without worrying about how many other individuals will be there. If the neighborhood amenities are sufficiently attractive, sufficient numbers of people will begin to frequent the neighborhood, creating a safe high-traffic equilibrium that is sustainable even after the police presence has slackened.

D. Traffic: Congestion Pricing in Sweden

Traffic is another problem potentially amenable to analysis from the perspective of multiple equilibria. Traffic causes all kinds of externalities and is universally regulated in some form or another. Many cities have experimented with so-called congestion pricing, in which costs of driving in crowded downtown areas increase during peak usage times. One might imagine that an effect of this pricing would be to incentivize drivers to take public transit or other alternative means of transportation. If so, it might be conceivable that a temporary scheme of congestion pricing would be sufficient to induce lower levels of driving.

We know of one experiment with temporary regulation in this regard. From January to July 2006, Stockholm instituted a trial period of congestion pricing to reduce traffic.\(^{153}\) The pricing program put a flat rate of $2.60 on all vehicles entering Stockholm during peak hours, and a rate ranging from $1.30 to $2 for other times during the day.\(^{154}\) By the time the trial ended on July 31, 2006, Stockholm had experienced a 22 percent drop in traffic and travel time.\(^{155}\)

Following the trial period, a referendum was held in September 2006 allowing residents to decide whether to reintroduce the system on a permanent basis. The pricing system was approved by 52 percent of the city’s voters, and was thus reintroduced in August 2007.\(^{156}\) Both the congestion policy and the


The subsequent period of driving without a fee were temporary in character.

The initial experiment was conducted on a temporary basis primarily for political reasons.\textsuperscript{157} In the 2002 national election, the Social Democrats won a plurality and formed a government by attracting the support of the Environmentalist Party.\textsuperscript{158} In return, the Social Democrats agreed to the congestion-pricing experiment.\textsuperscript{159} They also had to convince the Stockholm Social Democrats, who had promised not to engage in congestion pricing, to implement the experiment.\textsuperscript{160} Popular support for the program was low before the trial started.\textsuperscript{161} A poll in fall 2005 showed that around 43 percent of Stockholm residents supported the decision to conduct a congestion pricing trial.\textsuperscript{162} In fact, when the trial started, public opposition to the fees ran as high as 75 percent.\textsuperscript{163} By May 2006, however, support had increased: only 41 percent of Stockholm residents thought the trial was a bad idea.\textsuperscript{164} The temporary law thus revealed information about preferences. Support consistently increased and by May 2011, support for the policy was at 70 percent. The reason for this support is still unclear: it could be because people enjoyed fewer traffic jams and delays, people adjusted their driving patterns, people shifted to public transit, or a combination of the three.\textsuperscript{165}

Interestingly, although a new political equilibrium was produced by the temporary law, the underlying levels of driving were unaffected during the immediate post-trial period. The congestion policy was not in place between July 2006 (when the trial period ended) and August 2007 (when the policy was reintroduced permanently). During this period, traffic rose close to the level it had been before congestion pricing was

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See id.
\item Id at 859.
\item Id.
\item Hårsman and Quigley, 29 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt at 859 (cited in note 156).
\item See id.
\item Id.
\item See Jackson, \textit{The Cure for Congestion} (cited in note 155).
\item See Plumer, \textit{How Sweden Cut Traffic Congestion} (cited at note 154).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
ever implemented.\textsuperscript{166} Had driving levels stayed low, of course, there would have been less need for a permanent congestion-pricing policy.\textsuperscript{167} So one outcome of this experiment was to reveal that a temporary law was \textit{insufficient} to reorder the underlying behavior that was the target of regulation. This was not a case of multiple equilibria, a fact that the temporary ban revealed. We include this example to illustrate that temporary law may occasionally fail to validate the existence of a second equilibrium. When this is the case, policy makers must simply adopt the approach that Swedish authorities followed here: decide whether a permanent law is warranted by some market failure other than path dependence.

E. Bank Holidays and Trading Curbs

Examples of temporary law can also be found in the financial sector. Consider first the problem of a run on a bank. Bank runs are caused when too many depositors try to pull their deposits out of a bank in too short of a time frame.\textsuperscript{168} Even when the bank is solvent, it might not have sufficient liquidity to pay all of the depositors at once, causing the bank to fail.\textsuperscript{169} The problem can be self-reinforcing: the more depositors who withdraw their money from the bank, the more that the remaining depositors must fear that the bank will not have sufficient reserves to pay them if they attempt to withdraw funds.\textsuperscript{170}

Accordingly, a bank run can be driven by a rational collective action problem: it is separately rational for each individual to rush to the bank and withdraw her money, even if it would be collectively superior if they were all to leave their money on deposit.\textsuperscript{171} A bank run can also be caused by behavioral errors, namely panic—an irrational stampede to the exit.\textsuperscript{172}


\textsuperscript{167} See Jackson, \textit{The Cure for Congestion} (cited in note 155).


\textsuperscript{169} Id.

\textsuperscript{170} Id. See also McAdams, 82 S Cal L Rev at 216–17 (cited in note 10) (describing a bank run as a coordination game with multiple equilibria).


\textsuperscript{172} Id.
We can thus conceive of the banking system as operating at one of two equilibria: a “stable” equilibrium, in which banks are solvent, depositors have no need to pull out their money, and no one is panicked; and a “running” equilibrium, in which banks may lack necessary liquidity, depositors are in the midst of a race to withdraw their funds, and panic is widespread. Both of these equilibria are self-reinforcing, in the sense that no individual has an incentive to change her behavior absent an exogenous shock of some sort (such as a news report that a bank has become insolvent).\textsuperscript{173}

Suppose that one or more banks tip into a dangerous “running” equilibrium and depositors are racing to withdraw their deposits. How might policy makers trigger a switch to a stable equilibrium? The solution that President Franklin Roosevelt employed during the Great Depression was a temporary law: a bank holiday during which banks were closed and no money could be deposited or withdrawn.\textsuperscript{174} These bank holidays typically lasted only a few days, but nonetheless they effectively flipped the status quo.\textsuperscript{175} Before the inception of the temporary law, banks and customers were stuck in a running equilibrium. When the law elapsed, the status quo was zero activity—no one had been making withdrawals, precisely because of the holiday.

If we believed that only one equilibrium—a running equilibrium—was possible, we should have expected a bank run to resume immediately after a bank holiday ended. But this is not what occurred. Roosevelt’s bank holidays were generally quite successful at ending bank runs.\textsuperscript{176} This indicates that a simple change in the starting point, produced by temporary law, can result in a very different outcome due to path dependence.

Trading curbs, sometimes known as trading “circuit breakers,” play a similar role in arresting steep declines in securities markets. Just like a bank run, a stock market crash or a precipitous drop in the price of a single stock might be caused by either


\textsuperscript{175} See id.

\textsuperscript{176} See id (describing the success of bank holidays at stabilizing the banking system).
rational or irrational factors. From a rational perspective, if one investor sees other investors selling a stock (or many stocks), causing its price to drop, she might rationally choose to sell as well in order to avoid being left holding a much lower-priced asset. This could be the case even if she believes that the stock is actually worth more than the current price. She may need liquidity in the near future and be unable to hold onto the stock long enough to wait for it to rise. And of course she may take the drop in the stock’s price as information that the stock is worth much less than she believed. What she believes to be true information could actually be an information cascade, in which each individual believes that the others have valuable information when in fact no one (or only the few people who trigger the cascade) knows anything of significance.

On the other hand, investors might be irrationally panicking about a stock (or an entire market or economy) and needlessly rushing to unload securities and hide their money in something safer. In either case, the stock market is trapped in a self-destructive equilibrium. This is opposed to the typical

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183 It is of course possible that the stock or the market is highly overvalued and the crash is appropriate. But it is widely believed that stock market crashes (or run-ups)
market equilibrium in which investors are not panicked and are not chasing one another into a downward spiral.

The solution to the problem of stock market crashes is a temporary law very similar to Roosevelt's bank holidays. Every major securities exchange in the United States imposes trading curbs, otherwise known as “circuit breakers,” that automatically cut off trading in a stock or an entire market when that market falls by a certain percentage in a single day. These circuit breakers are even more temporary than bank holidays: they typically last only until the end of the trading day. But just like bank holidays, they reverse the status quo. Before the circuit breaker takes effect, the market is stuck in a “running” equilibrium. After the circuit breaker has lapsed (the very next day), the market is starting from a stable equilibrium. If there is in fact only one possible equilibrium—that is, if the stock market crash is based on correct, rational valuations of the securities—then we should expect the crash to resume the very next day as the running equilibrium reemerges. But in fact market circuit breakers often halt stock market crashes, with the market reverting to a stable equilibrium and rising the next day. Such is the power of temporary law to locate a second potential equilibrium, even when that temporary law lasts only part of a day.

CONCLUSION

Conflicts between libertarians and those in favor of regulation, along with new attention to behavioral biases, have

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186 See id.


188 Of course, not all temporary interventions in the market are so successful. In August 1971, President Richard Nixon sought to curb inflation by imposing temporary wage and price controls. See President Nixon Imposes Wage and Price Controls (The Econ Review), online at http://www.econreview.com/events/wageprice1971b.htm (visited Mar 2, 2014). Some policy makers seemed to believe that the United States was stuck in an inflationary equilibrium, in which wages and prices collectively spiraled higher, and that a temporary ban on increases would restore a lower-inflation equilibrium. See id. That turned out not to be the case, as inflation continued to increase throughout the decade in the face of repeated unsuccessful interventions. See id.
motivated a search for more effective and less intrusive regulatory devices. In this Article, we highlight one such mechanism: temporary law. We show that under certain conditions, it is possible to utilize temporary law to identify information on the most efficient outcome, and to do so in a way that is less politically costly than an equivalent permanent law. These conditions occur when (1) there are multiple equilibria and good reasons for believing that the status quo is stuck in an inefficient equilibrium, and (2) there are informational barriers to identifying the superior equilibrium.

Using the example of smoking bans, we have shown that temporary law is plausible and likely to be superior to a permanent law on several dimensions. The temporary approach will be better at revealing information than a permanent ban, which imposes a new equilibrium without establishing that it is the optimal equilibrium. A temporary ban will certainly be less intrusive of the liberties of smokers. And it is likely to be politically easier to adopt, given that the costs will not be borne permanently. The explicitly experimental, information-forcing rationale of temporary law may win over some opponents of particular policies. The idea of temporary law easily generalizes, as we show by applying it beyond the smoking example to seat belt mandates, affirmative action policies, curfews, traffic regulation, and bank holidays.